Eco-bursaries as incentives for conservation around Arabuko-Sokoke Forest, Kenya


Jackson, M M.; Naughton-Treves, L

Environmental Conservation 39(4): 347-356

2012


Incentives used to encourage local residents to support conservation range from integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), which indirectly connect improved livelihoods with biodiversity protection, to direct payments for ecosystem services (PES). A unique hybrid between these two strategies, the Arabuko-Sokoke Schools and Ecotourism Scheme (ASSETS), provides secondary-school bursaries to encourage stewardship of a biodiverse highly-imperiled Kenyan forest. Household surveys and semi-structured interviews were used to assess the effectiveness of ASSETS by comparing attitudes and perceptions toward the forest among scheme beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The most commonly identified benefit of the forest was resource extraction (for example fuelwood), followed by ecosystem services (such as source of rain). Those in favour of forest clearing tended not to be ASSETS beneficiaries, were lesseducated, and were less likely to mention ecosystem services and tourism as forest benefits. ASSETS appears to shape pro-conservation attitudes among beneficiaries and foster a sense of responsibility toward the forest. Challenges for ASSETS are similar to those faced by many conservation and development projects, namely unsteady funding and the risk that the extremely poor may be overlooked. ASSETS may serve as an effective hybrid between the PES and ICDP approaches, and such educational support provides a promising conservation incentive.

Environmental
Conservation
39
(4):
347-356
(0
Foundation
for
Environmental
Conservation
2012
doi:10.1017/S0376892912000161
Eco-bursaries
as
incentives
for
conservation
around
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest,
Kenya
MICHELLE
M.
JACKSON"
AND
LISA
NAUGHTON-TREVES
2
'Department
of
Zoology,
431
Birge
Hall,
University
of
Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison,
WI
53706,
USA,
and
'Department
of
Geography,
University
of
Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison,
WI
53706,
USA
Date
submitted:
3
August
2011;
Date
accepted:
14
April
2012;
First
published
online:
1
June
2012
SUMMARY
Incentives
used
to
encourage
local
residents
to
support
conservation
range
from
integrated
conservation
and
development
projects
(ICDPs),
which
indirectly
connect
improved
livelihoods
with
biodiversity
protection,
to
direct
payments
for
ecosystem
services
(PES).
A
unique
hybrid
between
these
two
strategies,
the
Arabuko-Sokoke
Schools
and
Ecotourism
Scheme
(ASSETS),
provides
secondary-school
bursaries
to
en-
courage
stewardship
of
a
biodiverse
highly-imperiled
Kenyan
forest.
Household
surveys
and
semi-structured
interviews
were
used
to
assess
the
effectiveness
of
ASSETS
by
comparing
attitudes
and
perceptions
toward
the
forest
among
scheme
beneficiaries
and
non-
beneficiaries.
The
most
commonly
identified
benefit
of
the
forest
was
resource
extraction
(for
example
fuelwood),
followed
by
ecosystem
services
(such
as
source
of
rain).
Those
in
favour
of
forest
clearing
tended
not
to
be
ASSETS
beneficiaries,
were
less-
educated,
and
were
less
likely
to
mention
ecosystem
services
and
tourism
as
forest
benefits.
ASSETS
appears
to
shape
pro-conservation
attitudes
among
beneficiaries
and
foster
a
sense
of
responsibility
toward
the
forest.
Challenges
for
ASSETS
are
similar
to
those
faced
by
many
conservation
and
development
projects,
namely
unsteady
funding
and
the
risk
that
the
extremely
poor
may
be
overlooked.
ASSETS
may
serve
as
an
effective
hybrid
between
the
PES
and
ICDP
approaches,
and
such
educational
support
provides
a
promising
conservation
incentive.
Keywords:
attitudes,
conservation,
Kenya,
park-people
relationships,
perceptions,
protected
areas
INTRODUCTION
The
relationship
between
biodiversity
conservation
and
poverty
is
complex
and
varies
according
to
the
site
and
scale
of
analysis
(Agrawal
&
Redford
2006;
Adams
&
Hutton
2007;
Barrett
et
al.
2011).
Most
experts
view
severe
poverty
as
a
long-term
threat
to
local
biodiversity
(Fisher
&
*Correspondence:
Dr
Michelle
M.
Jackson
Tel:
+1
828
734
4460
e-mail:
Christopher
2007).
Others
are
concerned
that
conservation
may
itself
impoverish
local
citizens
if
they
lose
access
to
vital
resources
(Brockington
&
Schmidt-Soltau
2004).
Integrated
conservation
and
development
projects
(ICDPs)
represent
one
broad
strategy
for
connecting
poverty
alleviation
with
biodiversity
conservation
indirectly.
ICDPs
typically
aim
to
improve
community
involvement
in
conservation
through
shared
decision-making
authority,
employment,
revenue-
sharing,
limited
harvesting
of
resources,
or
provision
of
community
facilities
such
as
schools
or
hospitals
(Newmark
&
Hough
2000).
ICDPs
promise
to
reverse
top-down,
centre-
driven
conservation
and
build
the
local
support
essential
to
long-term
biodiversity
protection
(Schwartzman
et
al.
2000).
However,
such
projects
have
had
mixed
success
(Robinson
&
Redford
2004).
ICDPs
seldom
significantly
raise
incomes
(Agrawal
&
Redford
2006),
and
when
they
have,
it
is
rarely
clear
how
this
benefited
biodiversity
conservation
(Wells
et
al.
2006).
Some
have
criticized
the
approaches
used
by
ICDPs
as
being
paternalistic,
such
as
promoting
collective
activities
where
there
is
no
tradition
of
such
(Campbell
&
Vainio-Mattila
2003).
Many
conservationists
have
since
turned
to
direct
incentive-based
approaches,
such
as
payments
for
ecosystem
services
(PES;
Ferraro
&
Simpson
2002;
Wunder
2007;
Swallow
et
al.
2009).
Direct
approaches
promise
to
more
effectively
and
efficiently
yield
conservation
by
tying
tangible
benefits
for
local
citizens
to
conservation
outcomes
(Niesten
&
Rice
2004;
Milne
&
Niesten
2009).
Some
proponents
suggest
that
direct
payments
are
fairer
and
less
paternalistic
than
ICDPs,
since
local
communities
can
decide
how
best
to
use
the
income
(see
Child
1996).
Critics
counter
that
direct
payments
provide
only
short-term
solutions
that
fail
to
adequately
incorporate
local
social
processes
(Romero
&
Andrade
2004).
Furthermore,
direct
incentives
may
not
distribute
benefits
equitably
within
communities
and
poorer
marginalized
households
lose
out
(Spiteri
&
Nepal
2006).
Although
direct
payments
may
be
efficient
as
a
short-term
solution
when
a
habitat
or
species
is
immediately
threatened,
they
potentially
create
dependency
on
cash
flow
from
outside
the
local
community
and
vulnerability when
rewards
are
withdrawn. Ultimately,
the
polarized
debate
surrounding
indirect
versus
direct
approaches
has
limited
utility
for
field
practitioners,
who
recognize
that
conservation
approaches
must
be
flexible
and
tailored
to
local
context.
Education
is
often
featured
in
ICDPs
as
part
of
a
long-
term
process
of
local
empowerment,
whether
in
the
form
Kilometres
25
50
N
Lame
KENYA
ti
G
0
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
ti
ti
Malindi
Kilifi
Research
Location
4°S
Mombasa
KENYA
°
Nairobi
3'S
Shimoni
4rE
40°E
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
.Mijomboni
Nature
Reserve
.(\
.
ogamachuko
c7
0
ti
.Nyari
--Tarmac
Road
N
Kilometres
348
M. M.
Jackson
and
L.
Naughton-Treves
Figure
1
Location
of
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
and
the
communities
studied.
of
programmes
to
improve
local
awareness
of
the
value
of
ecosystems
or
via
actual
construction
of
schools.
For
one,
positive
attitudes
toward
conservation
among
local
residents
are
often
associated
with
higher
levels
of
schooling,
due
to
either
increased
awareness
and/or
a
shift
in
livelihood
(Fiallo
&
Jacobson
1995;
McClanahan
et
al.
2005;
Wang
et
al.
2006).
Indeed,
several
studies
argue
that
ICDPs
should
focus
on
education so
as
to
reduce
individuals'
dependence
on
natural
resources
(Gunatilake
1998;
Hedge
&
Enters
2000;
Gubbi
et
al.
2008).
Education
is
now
also
appearing
in
direct
incentive
programmes,
where
rewards
are
predicated
on
immediate
conservation
outcomes.
For
example,
free
or
subsidized
education
is
provided
to
the
children
of
parents
who
engage
in
conservation
activities
in
Haiti
(Nature
Canada
2011)
and
the
Solomon
Islands
(TDA
[Tetepare
Descendants'
Association]
2011).
Tethering
the
provision
of
education
to
compliance
with
conservation,
however,
presents
ethical
dilemmas
that
differ
from
those
associated
with
cash
payments
because
children
are
the
direct
recipients
and
secondary
education
would
ideally
be
accessible
to
any
citizen.
Here,
we
offer
an
assessment
of
a
novel
education-
oriented
approach
to
conservation
around
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
(ASF),
a
biodiversity
hotspot
on
the
Kenyan
coast
(Fig.
1).
By
paying
secondary
school
fees
contingent
on
recipients'
support
for
forest
conservation
and
engaging
local
residents
in
collective
tree-planting
initiatives,
Arabuko-
Sokoke
Schools
and
Ecotourism
Scheme
(ASSETS)
incorporates
the
performance-responsive
aspect
of
direct
payments
while
also
addressing
long-term
development
needs
via
education,
support
for
community
organizations
and
alternative
livelihoods.
Initiated
in
2001
by
A
Rocha
Kenya,
the
goal
of
ASSETS
is
to
increase
environmental
awareness,
reward
conservation
behaviour
and
develop
skills
for
youth
to
find
non-forest-dependent
livelihoods
(ASSETS
2011).
To
be
eligible
for
an
ASSETS
bursary,
a
student
must
live
within
3
km
of
ASF,
have
attended
an
ASSETS-
targeted
primary
school
for
at
least
three
years,
score
at
least
300/500
(slightly
above
passing)
on
their
Kenya
Certificate
of
Primary
Education
(KCPE)
exam,
and
have
obtained
an
admissions
letter
from
a
public
secondary
school.
In
addition,
the
student's
parents
must
sign
a
written
agreement
stating
that
they
will
(1)
maintain
a
woodlot
at
their
home,
(2)
protect
ASF
and
Mida
Creek
(a
nearby
mangrove
ecosystem)
by
not
cutting
down
trees
or
harming
wild
animals,
(3)
be
actively
involved
in
conservation
initiatives
(such
as
tree
planting
or
wildlife
clubs),
and
(4)
contribute
Ksh
300
(c.
US$3.50
per
school
term)
(Appendix
1,
see
supplementary
material
at
Journals.cambridge.org/enc)
.
The
size
of
an
ASSETS
bursary
ranges
from
25-60%
of
secondary
school
tuition.
As
of
2010,
378
students
from
eight
primary
schools
had
received
ASSETS
bursaries
to
attend
secondary
school
and
74
of
those
had
graduated
from
secondary
school
(S.
Baya,
personal
communication
2011).
Along
with
administering
the
bursaries,
ASSETS
established
tree
nurseries
at
each
of
the
beneficiary
primary
schools,
and
over
16
500
trees
of
both
indigenous
and
exotic
species
had
been
planted
as
of
2008
(A
Rocha
Kenya
2008).
An
association
of
ASSETS
beneficiary
parents
was
formed
in
2006
and
registered
as
a
formal
community-based
organization
with
the
Kenya
Department
of
Social
Services,
with
optional
membership.
ASSETS
also
constructed
ecotourism
facilities,
including
a
small
visitor
centre,
a
suspended
mangrove
Eco-bursaries
as
incentives
for
conservation
349
Participants'
contributions
6%
i
A
Rocha
UK
13%
A
Rocha
International
27%
Figure
2
Sources
of
ASSETS
revenue
in
2008.
walkway
(which
generated
Ksh
394
330/US$
4744
in
2008),
and
two
tree
platforms
(which
generated
Ksh
52
920/US$
637
in
2008).
Tourism
revenue
from
these
facilities
contributes
a
modest portion
of
bursary
funding
(Fig.
2).
Although
the
bursary
award
is
explicitly
contingent
on
recipients'
formal
agreement
not
to
harm
the
forest
or
its
wildlife,
this
is
not
systematically
enforced.
Rather
forest
use
is
monitored
on
an
ad-hoc
basis
according
to
the
availability
of
funding
and
volunteers
(VandeGriend
2007,
Ngala
2010).
In
this
study
we
did
not
measure
extraction
due
to
both
ethical
and
practical
issues;
rather,
we
assessed
attitudes
as
a
proxy
signal
of
public
support.
We
appraise
the
impact
of
this
project,
along
with
independent
socioeconomic
factors,
on
local
citizens'
attitudes
and
perceptions
toward
ASF
in
three
forest-adjacent
communities
using
113
household
surveys
(Appendix
2
provides
socioeconomic
details
of
the
study
communities,
see
supplementary
material
at
Journals.cambridge.org/enc)
.
Understanding
residents'
attitudes
can
be
helpful
for
guiding
park
policy
and
management
decisions
(Fiallo
&
Jacobson
1995;
Browne-Nunez
&
Jonker
2008).
We
also
use
qualitative
interviews
with
local
citizens
and
project
leaders
regarding
the
problems
and
merits
of
this
`eco-bursary'
approach.
Specifically,
we
explore
the
feasibility
and
dilemmas
inherent
in
rewarding
local
citizens
with
education
contingent
on
specific
behaviours.
METHODS
Study
area
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
(ASF)
was
originally
declared
Crown
Forest
in
1932
and
was
gazetted
as
a
forest
reserve
in
1943.
At
42
000
ha,
ASF
is
the
largest
single
block
of
indigenous
coastal
forest
remaining
in
East
Africa
(ASFMT
[ASF
Management
Team]
2002),
a
habitat
reduced
by
>
90%
from
its
original
size
(Myers
et
al.
2000)
and
now
found
primarily
in
isolated
parks
and
reserves
amidst
an
agricultural
landscape
(Fig.
1;
Newmark
2008).
Today,
ASF
is
managed
jointly
by
four
government
departments,
including
the
Forest
Department
(FD),
Kenya
Forestry
Research
Institute
(KEFRI),
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
(KWS)
and
National
Museums
of
Kenya
(NMK)
(ASFMT
2002).
Within
5
km
of
ASF
lie
52
villages,
home
to
roughly
110
000
people,
mainly
of
the
Giriama
tribe
(ASFMT
2002).
Forest-
adjacent
farmers
suffer
from
low
crop
yields
due
to
sandy
soil
and
crop
damage
by
wildlife,
amounting
to
26-82%
in
some
cases
(Maundu
1993).
Despite
a
permanent
ban
on
timber
harvesting
in
Kenyan
forest
reserves
(in
effect
since
2000;
only
one
head-bundle
of
dead
firewood
is
allowed
per
day,
along
with
wild
fruit
and
water
for
subsistence),
many
residents
risk
arrest
or
pay
bribes
to
forest
guards
in
order
to
cut
trees
for
firewood,
building
poles
and
wood
carving,
and
hunt
wildlife
for
consumption
or
sale
(Fitzgibbon
et
al.
1995;
Gordon
&
Ayiemba
2003).
Research
involving
extensive
surveys
of
forest
damage
(counts
of
snares,
cut
stems
and
footpaths
into
the
forest
from
villages)
indicates
that
these
activities
pose
the
most
immediate
threat
to
the
forest
(Mogaka
et
al.
2001;
Ngala
2010).
Legal
restrictions
on
forest
access
and
crop
loss
to
wildlife
have
led
to
hostile
attitudes
among
local
residents
towards
forest
authorities,
and
even
campaigns
for
de-gazettement
(Maundu
1993;
Gordon
&
Ayiemba
2003).
Mogaka
(1991)
reported
that
96%
of
farmers
were
'unhappy
with
the
forest',
and
54%
wanted
it
completely
cleared
for
settlement
(n
=
32).
A
follow-up
survey
(Maundu
1993)
found
that
59%
(n
=
142)
of
local
residents
wanted
the
entire
forest
cleared
for
agriculture.
Household
surveys
and
interviews
Michelle
Jackson
conducted
113
oral
household
surveys
in
June—August
2007.
Roughly
equal
numbers
of
ASSETS
beneficiary
and
non-beneficiary
households
were
sampled
in
each
of
three
communities
neighbouring
ASF:
Bogamachuko
(hereafter
`Bogs';
n
=
40),
Mijomboni
(n
=
33)
and
Nyari
(n
=
39;
Fig.
1).
ASSETS
beneficiary
households
were
selected
from
a
list
of
all
beneficiary
homes
and
visited
in
order
of
their
proximity
to
the
primary
schools,
with
effort
made
to
capture
variation
in
key
conditions
(such
as
distance
to
the
forest
edge
or
home
community).
For
each
targeted
benefi-
ciary,
a
nearby
(
<
0.5
km)
counterpart
non-beneficiary
home
was
selected
so
as
to
minimize
variation
among
respondents
related
to
geography
and
proximity
to
the
forest.
At
least
half
of
all
current
ASSETS
beneficiary
households
were
sampled
from
each
community.
In
ASSETS
beneficiary
households,
the
parent
who
normally
attended
the
weekly
ASSETS
parent
meetings
was
interviewed
if
possible.
Otherwise,
the
adult
in
the
household
most
willing
to
be
interviewed
was
chosen.
We
acknowledge
the
potential
bias
in
this
approach;
unwillingness
to
be
interviewed
might
correspond
to
negative
attitudes
toward
forest
conservation
or
engagement
in
illegal
resource
extraction.
Furthermore,
it
is
possible
that
ASSETS
beneficiaries
might
answer
questions
according
to
what
they
A
Rocha
Kenya
6%
Individual
donors
15%
Local
hotel
donations
7%
Eco-tourism
facilities
26%
350
M. M.
Jackson
and
L.
Naughton-Treves
thought
their
sponsors
would
want
to
hear.
To
minimize
these
biases,
the
interviewer
was
introduced
in
each
home
as
a
student
with
no
affiliation
to
any
organization,
governmental
or
otherwise.
Furthermore,
all
interviews
were
conducted
with
the
help
of
Mishi
Mwilo,
a
23-year
old
Giriama
woman
from
the
area
(though
not
from
one
of
the
study
communities)
who
was
fluent
in
Swahili,
Giriama
and
English,
and
served
as
a
translator
along
with
making
initial
introductions
at
the
start
of
the
interview.
She
was
not
affiliated
with
ASSETS
and
likely
helped
respondents
to
feel
comfortable
expressing
themselves.
The
interviews
were
conducted
either
in
Swahili
or
Giriama,
according
to
the
respondent's
preference.
Each
interview
lasted
approximately
45-60
minutes.
The
interview
included
questions
about
socioeconomic
conditions
(Appendix
2,
see
supplementary
material
at
Journals.cambridge.org/enc)
and
attitudes/perceptions
about
ASF.
One
measure
of
forest
attitudes
came
from
asking
the
person
simply
whether
or
not
s/he
'liked
the
forest'
and/or
wanted
the
forest
to
be
cleared.
The
follow-up
question,
`Who
owns
the
forest?'
provided
further
insight
regarding
a
respondent's
knowledge
about
forest
management
and
his/her
sense
of
ownership
or
responsibility
for
the
forest.
Broader
insight
on
local
perceptions
about
the
forest
came
from
asking
the
respondent
open-ended
questions
about
why
they
liked
or
disliked
the
forest,
why
they
wanted
or
did
not
want
the
forest
to
be
cleared,
and
what
benefits
and
problems
they
associated
with
the
forest.
Forest
perceptions
were
later
sorted
into
major
categories
that
were
created
inductively
after
recording
responses,
as
per
Allendorf
et
al.
(2006).
Finally,
we
asked
respondents
to
describe
the
goal
of
ASSETS
to
assess
whether
they
saw
a
connection
between
forest
conservation
and
the
bursaries.
Semi-structured
interviews
were
also
conducted
with
16
key
informants
in
the
communities,
including
primary
school
headmasters
and
teachers,
influential
community
members,
staff
from
the
Kenya
Wildlife
Service,
Nature
Kenya,
the
Kipepeo
Project
and
A
Rocha.
We
use
comments
made
by
respondents
and
key
informants
in
the
discussion
to
better
interpret
the
results
from
household
surveys.
Attitudes
and
perceptions
are
defined
in
this
study
using
the
theory
of
reasoned
action
(Ajzen
et
al.
1980)
and
its
application
for
park
attitude
research
from
Allendorf
et
al.
(2006).
Attitude
is
defined
as
a
human
psychological
tendency
that
is
expressed
by
evaluating
a
particular
entity,
called
an
attitude
object,
with
some
degree
of
favour
or
disfavour.
Attitudes
consist
of
beliefs,
which
are
the
associations
people
establish
between
the
attitude
object
and
various
attributes.
For
example,
in
the
phrase,
'I
like
the
forest
because
it
protects
wildlife',
liking
the
forest
is
considered
a
positive
attitude
about
the
forest,
and
the
protection
of
wildlife
is
considered
a
belief
about
the
forest's
role.
Here
we
use
the
term
perception
in
place
of
belief
(Allendorf
et
al.
2006;
Browne-Nunez
&
Jonker
2008).
Data
analysis
Survey
responses
were
first
analysed
using
Pearson's
chi-square
tests
and
ANOVA
to
look
for
correlations
among
socioeconomic
variables.
We
then
developed
logistic
regression
models
with
stepwise
AIC
(Akaike
Information
Criterion)
model
selection
to
select
the
best
explanatory
variables
for
predicting
favourable
attitudes
toward
forest
clearing,
as
well
as
each
perception
category
that
was
mentioned
by
at
least
10%
of
respondents.
Attitudes
were
assigned
a
value
of
0
if
a
respondent
did
not
want
the
forest
to
be
cleared
and
1
if
s/he
wanted
the
forest
cleared
or
if
his/her
answer
was
contingent
on
the
purpose
of
forest
clearing
(for
example,
the
respondent
would
approve
of
clearing
for
agriculture).
The
first
predictor
(independent)
variables
considered
were
socioeconomic,
including
individual
attributes
(sex,
age,
number
of
children,
years
of
formal
education,
religion,
level
of
wildlife
conflict
[scored
according
to
reported
amount
of
crop
loss
and
crop-
raiding
species],
and
whether
or
not
the
respondent
reported
extracting
forest
resources),
wealth
indicators
(such
as
type
of
roof,
whether
thatch
or
iron,
and
main
source
of
income
if
any,
such
as
subsistence
farming,
sale
of
farm
products
or
wage
labour),
geographic
attributes
(community
and
distance
in
km
from
the
respondent's
home
to
the
forest
edge)
and
ASSETS
participation
(either
yes
or
no).
We
then
developed
a
logistic
regression
model
to
predict
attitude
using
only
perception
categories
(benefits
and
problems
associated
with
the
forest)
as
predictor
variables,
in
order
to
assess
whether
approval
of
forest
clearing
was
associated
with
certain
beliefs
about
the
forest.
We
considered
the
best
model
to
be
the
one
in
which
AAIC
<
2
and
all
variables
were
significant
(p
<
0.05).
All
statistical
analyses
were
carried
out
in
R
(R
Development
Core
Team
2008).
RESULTS
Socioeconomic
characteristics
of
respondents
Approximately half
of
the
113
interviewees
were
parents
of
an
ASSETS
beneficiary
(n
=
60),
and
48%
had
no
formal
education
(Appendix
2
provides
correlations
among
socioeconomic
variables,
see
supplementary
material
at
Journals.cambridge.org/enc)
.
ASSETS
beneficiaries
tended
to
be
slightly
older
(F
=
4.50,
p
=
0.04),
have
more
children
(F
=
9.09,p
<
0.01),
and
live
further
from
the
forest
(F
=
6.29,
p
=
0.01)
than
non-beneficiaries.
Attitudes
and
perceptions
toward
ASF
Most
respondents
indicated
positive
attitudes
toward
ASF
(Table
1).
Only
6%
of
respondents
said
that
they
did
not
like
the
forest,
and
80%
did
not
want
the
forest
to
be
cleared.
ASSETS
beneficiaries
were
significantly
more
likely
to
object
to
forest
clearing
(p
<
0.001)
and
to
state
that
the
forest
was
owned
by
the
community
alone
or
in
partnership
with
the
government
(p
=
0.03).
Yet
only
39%
of
ASSETS
participants
mentioned
forest
conservation
when
asked
to
describe
the
programme
goals.
Fifty-one
per
cent
said
that
the
goal
was
Eco-bursaries
as
incentives
for
conservation
351
Table
1
Answers
to
four
survey
questions
grouped
by
ASSETS
participation.
The
second
question,
'Do
you
want
the
forest
to
be
cleared?',
was
used
as
an
indicator
of
respondents'
attitudes
toward
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
in
the
logistic
regression
analysis.
t
Significance
of
this
variable
could
not
be
reliably
determined
because
at
least
one
cell
in
the
chi-square
test
had
expected
values
of
<
5.
*,
***Significance
ofp
<
0.05
and
p
<
0.001,
respectively,
with
a
Pearson's
chi-square
test.
indicates
not
applicable
Survey
question
Answer
ASSETS
(n
=
60)
(%)
Non-ASSETS
(n
=
53)
(%)
Total
(n
=
113)
(%)
`Do
you
like
the
forest?'t
Yes
98
89
94
No
2
11
6
`Do
you
want
the
forest
cleared?'**
Yes/depends
8
34
20
No
92
66
80
`Who
owns
the
forest?'*
Government
56
74
64
Community
21
16
19
Both
18
4
11
Don't
know
5
6 6
`What
is
the
goal
of
ASSETS?'
Conservation
39
Education/poverty
alleviation
51
Don't
know
11
education
and/or
poverty
alleviation,
and
11%
could
not
identify any
goal
of
ASSETS
(Table
1).
Perceptions
were
grouped
into
categories
of
specific
benefits
and
problems
that
respondents
associated
with
ASF
(Table
2).
Five
positive
perception
categories
emerged:
direct
use,
ecosystem
services,
ASSETS,
tourism,
indirect
economic
benefits
and
governmental
benefits.
The
most
frequently
mentioned
positive
perception
category
was
direct
use
(68%),
which
most
often
included
firewood,
poles
and
timber,
respectively.
Ecosystem
services
was
the
second-most
cited
(65%),
with
the
most
common
benefit
from
the
forest
being
rain,
followed
by
providing
food
and
shelter
for
animals
and
providing
seeds
for
tree
nurseries.
The
most
frequently
mentioned
negative
perception
category
was
wildlife
crop-
raiding
(67%),
of
which
elephants
(Loxodonta
africana)
were
the
most
commonly
reported
problem
species.
Other
crop
raiding
animals
mentioned
by
>
5%
of
respondents
included
bushpigs
(Potamochoerus
larvatus),
baboons
(Papio
cynocephalus),
Syke's
monkeys
(Cercopithecus
albogularis)
and
duikers
(Cephalophus
sp.).
Twenty-three
per
cent
of
respondents
complained
of
mistreatment
by
KWS
forest
guards,
including
beatings,
arrests
and
corruption.
Four
per
cent
of
respondents
did
not
mention
any
benefits
associated
with
the
forest,
and
22%
did
not
mention
any
problems.
According
to
the
best
logistic
regression
model
using
only
socioeconomic
variables
as
predictors,
those
most
likely
to
approve
forest
clearing
were
non-ASSETS
beneficiaries
and
those
who
were
less
educated
(Table
3).
When
perceptions
of
the
forest
(categories
of
benefits
and
problems)
were
instead
used
as
predictor
variables,
those
respondents
who
approved
forest
clearing
were
least
likely
to
identify
ecosystem services
and
tourism
as
benefits
of
the
forest.
Further
analysis
revealed
distinct
patterns
between
socioeconomic
variables
and
perceived
benefits
and
problems
of
the
forest
(Table
3).
Males
and
those
who
reported
forest
use
were
more
likely
and
those
with
a
thatched
roof
(i.e.
less
wealthy)
less
likely
to
value
the
forest
as
a
source
of
resources.
Meanwhile
those
with
more
formal
education
were
more
likely
to
identify
ecosystem
services
as
a
forest
benefit.
DISCUSSION
Predictors
of
pro-conservation
perceptions
Across
the
three
communities,
the
majority
of
respondents'
attitudes
toward
the
forest
(ASF)
were
positive,
an
encouraging
result
given
previous
local
opposition
(Mogaka
1991;
Maundu
et
al.
1997).
The
fact
that
respondents
most
commonly
valued
ASF
as
a
source
of
fuelwood,
timber
and
poles
presents
a
paradox
considering
that
any
wood
extraction
beyond
a
single
headload
of
fuelwood
per
household
per
day
is
illegal.
Apparently,
although
many
local
citizens
voice
general
support
for
ASF,
they
do
not
necessarily
agree
with
strict
preservation
measures,
a
common
situation
around
tropical
reserves
(see
for
example
Petheram
&
Campbell
2010).
However,
many
other
respondents
cited
the
forest's
ability
to
bring
rainfall
as
a
reason
for
protection.
According
to
one
woman,
the
forest
were
cleared],
this
area
would
be
very
dry'.
This
response
indicates
local
awareness
of
indirect
benefits
from
conservation,
even
though
the
actual
relationship
between
forest
cover
and
rainfall
at
ASF
has
not
been
conclusively
documented.
Wealthier
respondents
were
more
likely
to
identify
tourism
as
a
forest
benefit,
as
were
residents
of
Mijomboni,
the
community
closest
to
hotels
and
tourist
attractions
(Fig
1).
As
at
many
tropical
forest
sites
(Archabald
&
Naughton-
Treves
2001;
Karanth
&
DeFries
2011),
tourism
activities
are
locally
concentrated
and
seldom
benefit
the
very
poor.
Respondents'
negative
perceptions
of
ASF
centred
primarily
on
wildlife
crop-raiding,
a
commonly
reported
problem
around
African
reserves
surrounded
by
agriculture
(O'Connell-Rodwell,
et
al.
2000).
Non-beneficiaries
were
352
M. M.
Jackson
and
L.
Naughton-Treves
Table
2
Positive
and
negative
perceptions
of
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest
mentioned
by
ASSETS
and
non-ASSETS
respondents.
Perception
categories
are
in
bold;
these
were
created
inductively
after
recording
specific
answers
to
the
open-ended
question,
`what
benefits
and
problems
do
you
associate
with
the
forest?'.
*,
**,
***Significance
of
<
0.05,
<
0.01,
and
<
0.001
respectively,
with
a
Pearson's
chi-square
test.
Perceptions
ASSETS
(n
=
60)(%)
Non-ASSETS
(n
=
53)(%)
Total
(n=113)(%)
Positive
perceptions
Direct
Use
68
68
68
Firewood
43
43
49
Poles
47
42
44
Timber
22
19
20
Bushmeat
7
8
7
Wild
fruits
12
2
7
Medicinal
plants
10
2
6
Other
(includes
water,
charcoal,
cultivation,
wood
for
carving,
all
mentioned
by
<5%
of
respondents)
Ecosystem
services
70
60
65
Brings
rain
63
55
59
Food/shelter
for
animals
8 8 8
Seeds
for
tree
nurseries
5
2
4
Other
(includes
cool
shade,
windbreaker,
clean
air,
soil
protection
all
mentioned
by
<5%
of
respondents)
ASSETS***
68
6
39
Bursary
63
6
36
Field
trips
to
forest
7
2
4
Tourism**
37
15
27
Indirect
economic
13
19
16
Employment
2
4
3
Brings
ICDPs
12
15
13
Helps
the
government
2
8
4
Negative
perceptions
Crop
raiding
by
wildlife
60
47
54
Mistreatment
by
guards
25
21
23
Lost
access
to
resources*
7
23
14
Danger
(includes
fear
of
robbers,
insects,
accidents
or
other
threats)
8
6
7
Table
3
Model
coefficients
from
the
best
logistic
regression
models
for
residents'
attitude
(as
indicated
by
the
question,
'Do
you
want
the
forest
to
be
cleared?')
and
perceptions
toward
Arabuko-Sokoke
Forest.
For
predicting
respondents'
attitude,
one
model
included
only
socioeconomic
predictors
and
one
model
included
only
perceptions
as
predictors.
Dashed
lines
indicate
variables
that
were
included
in
the
model
selection
but
were
not
significant
in
the
best
model.
For
predicting
respondents'
perceptions,
only
socioeconomic
predictors
were
included
in
the
model
selection.
Predictor
variable
Model
set
(response
variables)
Attitude
Perceptions
Favour
forest
clearing
Direct
use
Ecosystem
Tourism
services
Indirect
economic
Wildlife
problems
Mistreatment
by
guards
Access
problems
Socioeconomic
ASSETS
—1.44
1.21
—1.37
Education
—0.17
0.20
Male
1.69
Use
forest
1.34
Thatch
roof
—1.18
—1.16
2.06
Nyari
—1.74
Mijomboni
1.44
1.55
No
religion
—2.27
Wildlife
conflict
1.81
Wage
income
—1.97
Perceptions
Ecosystem
services
—1.62
Tourism
—2.55
Eco-bursaries
as
incentives
for
conservation
353
more
likely
to
resent
restricted
forest
access;
for
instance,
one
man
reported,
'How
would
I
like
something
that's
closed
to
me?'
By
contrast,
most
ASSETS
beneficiaries
voiced
support
for
restricted
access;
one
man
stated,
'We
are
at
war
with
whoever
destroys
the
forest;
we
will
find
other
ways
of
living
rather
than
depending
on
the
forest'.
Similarly
more
ASSETS
beneficiaries
felt
a
sense
of
co-ownership
of
the
forest
in
partnership
with
the
government.
As
one
beneficiary
said,
'In
the
old
days
[the
forest]
was
for
the
government
but
currently
it's
for
the
community
because
we
are
the
ones
to
protect
it
so
we
can
benefit'.
Non-beneficiaries
were
more
likely
to
describe
a
sense
of
alienation
and
to
report
IThe
forest]
is
owned
by
the
government
and
white
people'.
Although
our
results
signal
improved
local
attitudes
toward
conservation,
we
cannot
assume
that
ASF
is
better
conserved.
Neither
positive
attitudes
towards
parks
nor
environmental
awareness
necessarily
lead
to
conservation-oriented
behaviour
(Infield
&
Namara
2001;
but
see
Gubbi
et
al.
2008).
Local
farmers
may
approve
a
park's
mission
to
protect
wildlife
yet
still
set
snares
(Naughton-Treves
1997)
or
demand
greater
access
to
park
resources
(Petheram
&
Campbell
2010).
Testing
the
attitude-behaviour
link
is
both
a
vital
next
step
for
park-
people
research
and
a
core
challenge
for
performance-based
educational
support.
A
hybrid
approach
Conservationists
often
debate
the
effectiveness
of
indirect
ICDPs
versus
direct
approaches
such
as
payments
for
ecosystem
services
(Ferraro
&
Simpson
2002;
Agrawal
&
Redford
2006).
Our
results
suggest
that
in
practice,
conservationists
need
to
draw
from
both
strategies,
particularly
if
they
are
working
in
a
site
of
high
conflict
and/or
high
poverty
(see
Petheram
&
Campbell
2010).
The
ASSETS
programme
at
ASF
features
ICDP
strategies;
for
example
the
eco-bursary
idea
was
born
during
early
discussions
with
community
leaders
prior
to
the
project's
inception
(S.
Baya,
personal
communication
2008),
and
continues
to
promote
voluntary
community-building
activities
such
as
tree-planting.
The
contractual
nature
of
the
eco-bursary
arrangement
resonates
more
with
performance-based
direct
incentive
approaches.
While
this
'hybrid'
approach
appears
to
have
significantly
improved
local
attitudes
toward
the
forest,
persistent
challenges
also
surfaced
in
our
analysis.
ICDPs
have
been criticized
for
failing
to
connect
livelihood
benefits
with
conservation
(Wells
et
al.
2006),
and
ASSETS
is
not
immune
to
this
critique.
Although
a
majority
(70%)
of
beneficiaries
cited
the
bursary
as
a
forest
benefit,
when
asked,
'What
is
the
goal
of
ASSETS?',
only
39%
mentioned
conservation.
PES
schemes
aim
to
clarify
this
link
by
paying
local
residents
directly
to
protect
natural
resources
(Ferraro
&
Kiss
2002).
ASSETS
incorporates
an
element
of
the
PES
approach
by
obliging
beneficiary
parents
to
sign
a
contract
agreeing
not
to
harm
the
forest.
However,
to
date
no
bursary
has
been
revoked
due
to
illegal
resource
extraction
(S.
Baya,
personal
communication
2011).
Tracing
illicit
forest
use
to
individuals
is
difficult
and
costly
(Gavin
et
al.
2010).
More
fundamentally,
dropping
beneficiaries
from
the
scheme
for
illicit
forest
use
might
create
resentment
among
community
members.
This
situation
reveals
that
the
PES
emphasis
on
efficiency
and
strict
conditionality
may
not
be
socially
acceptable
in
sites
of
long-standing
antagonism
between
conservation
and
local
communities.
While
ASSETS
does
not
conform
to
a
standard
PES
strategy
with
regard
to
conditionality
(Wunder
2007),
the
contracts
are
part
of
a
broader
set
of
outreach
activities
more
akin
to
ICDP
strategies
aimed
at
creating
a
sense
of
collective
responsibility
toward
forest
protection.
ASSETS
staff
regularly
visit
the
sponsored
communities
to
discuss
conservation
goals,
and
'beneficiary
days'
are
held
each
year
during
which
eco-bursary
students
attend
a
three-day
environmental
education
camp.
Further,
weekly
meetings
of
the
parents
association
at
the
tree
nurseries
help
to
forge
and
strengthen
relationships
between
neighbours.
One
revealed,
`I
even
leave
my
work
to
go
to
the
parent
meetings,
I
like
them
so
much'.
Sinclair
et
al.
(2011)
found
that
participation
in
ASSETS
led
to
multiple
transformative
learning
outcomes,
including
new
information
about
ASF,
new
skills
(such
as
tree
planting)
and
improved
ability
to
share
ideas
in
public
meetings.
Thus,
the
conditionality
imposed
by
the
contract
may
serve
to
provide
some
(if
symbolic)
accountability,
which
is
strengthened
by
the
collective
responsibility
formed
through
educational
outreach.
Conversely,
in
targeting
specific
individuals
for
benefits,
ASSETS
runs
counter
to
conventional
ICDP
approaches
and
risks
creating
resentment
and
division
within
communities.
Some
respondents
indicated
a
fear
of
being
reported
to
the
authorities
by
ASSETS
beneficiaries
if
they
illegally
extracted
resources
from
ASF;
for
example,
as
one
respondent
said,
`There
was
a
time
when
I
saw
people
going
[to
cut
trees]
in
the
forest;
I
had
to
tell
them
not
to
because
I
benefit
through
the
bursary.
They
stopped
because
they
knew
me,
but
you
never
know,
maybe
they
went
in
through
another
route.
Those
people
avoid
the
ASSETS
parents'.
Although
this
sort
of
community-based
vigilance
'may
help
some
PES
schemes
reduce
long-term
monitoring
and
enforcement
costs'
(Jack
et
al.
2008,
p.
9468),
it
risks
dividing
the
community.
The
issue
is
particularly
sensitive
given
that
some
respondents
believed
that
extremely
poor,
forest-adjacent
households
are
overlooked
by
ASSETS.
In
fact,
beneficiaries
were
not
significantly
wealthier
than
non-beneficiaries,
but
they
were
less
likely
to
live
directly
on
the
forest
border.
ASSETS
only
requires
that
a
student
live
<3
km
from
the
forest
and
attain
satisfactory
marks
on
primary
school
exams.
The
performance
criterion
was
a
sore
point
for
one
non-beneficiary:
'People
who
border
the
forest
don't
even
go
to
school.
Maybe
they
have
spent
the
whole
day
chasing
animals
to
deter
them
from
destroying
their
crops.
Someone
who
sleeps
at
night
will
get
a
lot
of
marks
[on
their
primary
school
exams]
but
someone
who
lives
next
to
the
forest,
he
won't
get
to
sleep
because
he
will
fear
the
elephants,
so
in
the
end
he
won't
perform
well
in
school'.
At
ASF,
as
elsewhere
in
East
Africa,
forest-adjacent
354
M. M.
Jackson
and
L.
Naughton-Treves
households
generally
suffer
more
from
wildlife
crop
raiding
(Naughton-Treves
1998).
Naughton-Treves
&
Treves
(2005)
found
that
guarding
fields
from
wildlife
can
compromise
educational
opportunities,
especially
if
farmers
are
too
poor
to
hire
field
guards
or
erect
barriers
and
instead
keep
their
children
home
to
guard
crops.
Extremely
poor
groups
often
lack
the
capital
to
join
a
project
in
the
first
place
(Peluso
1992),
yet
are
usually
those
who
suffer
the
most
from
restricted
access
to
protected
areas
(Adams
et
al.
2004)
and
depend
most
upon
forest
products
(Byron
&
Arnold
1999).
Although
inequality
of
opportunity
is
a
concern,
most
ASSETS
parents
could
not
have
paid
for
secondary
school
without
the
eco-
bursary
(see
also
Sinclair
et
al.
2011).
Furthermore,
other
projects
surrounding
ASF
specifically
target
forest-adjacent
households,
such
as
the
Kipepeo
Project
(Gordon
&
Ayiemba
2003).
Nonetheless,
the
difficulty
inherent
in
targeting
the
poorest,
most
forest-dependent
groups
is
commonly
acknowledged
in
PES
projects
(Grieg-Gran
et
al.
2005;
Petheram
&
Campbell
2010).
To
overcome
these
obstacles
to
participation,
some
scholars
recommend
activities
common
to
ICDPs,
including
strengthening
community
organizations
and
capacity
to
negotiate
(Corbera
et
al.
2007).
Finally,
securing
a
steady
income
flow
is
challenging
for
both
ICDPs
(Wells
et
al.
2006)
and
PES
(Wunder
2007).
Although
ASSETS
strives
to
fund
bursaries
from
ecotourism
revenue,
the
project
currently
relies
primarily
on
external
donor
funding.
In
2008,
an
additional
7%
of
ASSETS
income
was
generated
through
a
local
hotel
and
15%
came
from
individual
donors,
many
of
whom
learned
about
ASSETS
while
vacationing
on
the
Kenyan
coast.
So
while
the
ASSETS-
sponsored
ecotourism
facilities
themselves
may
not
generate
profits
sufficient
to
sustain
eco-bursaries,
they
have
inspired
many
tourists
to
donate
towards
ASSETS.
The
hybrid
approach
espoused
by
ASSETS
may
be
more
sustainable
than
a
PES
model
alone
(see
Petheram
&
Campbell
2010)
because
the
programme
is
not
solely
focused
on
direct
payments
to
individuals.
CONCLUSIONS
Our
results
indicate
a
significant
positive
shift
in
attitudes
toward
conservation
among
communities
neighbouring
ASF,
particularly
among
those
households
participating
in
the
ASSETS
programme.
ASSETS
features
a
unique
emphasis
on
`eco-bursaries'
and
couples
a
direct
incentive
(school
fees)
contingent
on
forest
protection
with
awareness
raising
and
community-oriented
activities
(such
as
tree
planting),
in
a
sense
combining
the
approaches
used
by
PES
programmes
and
ICDPs.
Secondary
education
is
highly
valued
but
unaffordable
in
many
forest-adjacent
communities;
the
provision
of
this
benefit
serves
as
a
unique
and
effective
bridge
between
direct
incentives
and
long-term
development
goals.
Our
interviews
with
community
members
and
key
informants
also
revealed
persistent
challenges,
especially
monitoring
compliance
with
forest
protection,
facilitating
participation
by
the
poorest
forest-adjacent
households
and
securing
long-
term
funding.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
M.
Jackson
conducted
all
field
work,
wrote
the
majority
of
text
and
analysed
data.
L.
Naughton
assisted
with
study
design,
analysis,
literature
review
and
writing.
This
research
was
funded
by
a
National
Geographic
Young
Explorers
Grant
and
the
Scott-Kloeck
Jenson
International
Internship
Grant
from
the
University
of
Wisconsin-Madison.
USAID
Translinks
Agreement
#EPP-A-00-06-00014-00
provided
partial
support
for
manuscript
preparation.
We
thank
the
people
in
Boga,
Mijomboni,
and
Nyari
who
participated
in
this
study,
Mishi
Mwilo
for
her
generous
assistance
in
the
field,
and
the
staff
and
volunteers
with
A
Rocha
Kenya
for
their
support
and
guidance.
Teri
Allendorf
and
Rick
Chenoweth
provided
substantial
guidance
on
the
methods.
We
also
thank
Diane
Adams
and
two
anonymous
reviewers
for
their
valuable
comments
on
the
manuscript.
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