Managing the forest: the conservation history of Lembus, Kenya, 1904-63


Anderson, D.

Conservation in Africa: people, policies and practice: 249-268

1987


A review and discussion of the administration of this 130 sq. mile area of valuable economic forest land, scrub and bush areas, and a large number of glades. It was one of the largest and most favourable land concessions made to Europeans in Kenya. Conflicts of political, social and commercial interests are traced between indigenous Africans who wished to continue to utilize the resources of the forest, the commercial company that wished to exploit the forest without interference, and the colonial Forest Department which sought to control and conserve the forest in order to maintain a financial return while also sustaining the forest resource.

12
Managing
the
forest:
the
conservation
history
of
Lembus,
Kenya,
1904-63
DAVID
ANDERSON
In
colonial
Africa,
as
elsewhere,
conservation
has
invariably
been
linked
to
the
dynamics
of
political
life.
The
colonial
state
in
Africa
set
down
the
parameters
within
which
conservation
policies
were
defined.
Attitudes
to
the
African
environment
evolved
as
the
colonial
period
progressed,
and
conservation
accordingly
took
on
new
forms
and
new
roles.
Although
historians
have
been
able
to
mark
out
'conservation
eras',
to
monitor
the
rise
of
public
awareness
of
particular
issues,
and
to
chart
the
emergence
of
technical
expertise
in
the
general
field
of
conservation
management,
they
have
also
stressed
the
conflicts
of
interest
present
at
every
phase
of
the
evolution
of
conservation
policies
(Powell,
1976;
McCracken,
1982;
Anderson,
1984;
Beinart,
1984;
Ofcansky,
1984;
Helms
&
Flader,
1985;
Anderson
&
Millington,
1987).
This
chapter
takes
up
these
themes
in
an
examination
of
the
colonial
history
of
conservation
in
the
Lembus
Forest
of
Kenya.
Lembus
was
awarded
to
a
commercial
company
for
the
development
of
a
timber
industry
while
the
British
conquest
of
the
region
was
still
incomplete.
It
was
one
of
the
largest
and
most
favourable
land
conces-
sions
made
to
Europeans
in
Kenya.
The
subsequent
administration
of
this
concession,
and
the
political
battles
that
ensued
for
control
over
the
management
of
Lembus,
are
the
central
concern
of
this
chapter.
The
political
struggle
that
emerged
was
three-sided,
between
Africans
who
wished
to
continue
to
utilise
the
resources
of
the
forest,
the
commercial
company
who
wished
to
exploit
the
forest
without
interference,
and
the
colonial
Forest
Department,
who
sought
to
control
and
conserve
the
forest
in
order
to
maintain
a
financial
return
while
also
sustaining
the
forest
resource.
Events
in
Lembus
serve
to
illustrate
the
manner
in
which
political
considerations
weighed
heavily
upon
government
attitudes
towards
land
use
and
conservation.
Contradictions
between
private
and
public
interests
were
clearly
exposed
in
the
problems
of
managing
the
Lembus
Forest,
and
exacerbated
by
the
need
to
reconcile
the
often
conflicting
aims
of
commerce
and
conservation.
249
indiret
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ndiani
Forest
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Lake
Turkana
Forest
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h
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alVaS
a
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o
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Township
Nakuru-Eldoret
Railway
10
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jJ
L
o
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ps
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Farms
erkerra
imboroa
Fore
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:
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4
o
embus
Forest::
Eldama
Ravine
Ravine
Farms
250
D.
All
derson
Fig.
12.1.
Lembus
Forest.
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
251
The
Lembus
Forest
The
Lembus
Forest
covers
an
area
of
approximately
130
sq.ml
.
(see
Figure
12.1).
It
is
made
up
variously
of
valuable
economic
forest
land,
some
scrub
and
bush
areas,
and
a
large
number
of
glades.
The
glades,
varying
from
30
to
300
acres
in
size,
offer
valuable
upland
grazing
to
herders
inhabiting
the
surrounding
lowlands.
Large
areas
of
the
forest-
proper
are
dense,
consisting
mainly
of
Podo
and
Cedar
woods,
with
considerable
quantities
of
bamboo
on
the
higher
parts.
Although
earlier
estimates
had
been
consistently
more
optimistic
(Johnston,
1902;
Eliot,
1905),
surveys
completed
in
the
1950s
revealed
that
around
55
per
cent
of
Lembus
then
comprised
economic
forest,
which
might
be
reserved
and
exploited
as
such.
l
Aside
from
commercial
aspects,
the
management
of
the
ecosystem
of
Lembus
has
far-reaching
importance
for
adjoining
areas,
the
forest
lying
across
the
watershed
dividing
the
river
systems
of
the
Rift
Valley
and
western
Kenya.
The
Perkerra
River,
which
feeds
Lake
Baringo,
rises
in
Lembus,
as
do
several
important
tributaries
of
the
Kerio
River
(Hutchins,
1909;
Hughes,
1949;
Kenya,
1950;
ALDEV,
1962).
From
the
human
aspect,
a
number
of
different
groups
have
made
use
of
the
forest
in
the
recent
past.
Uasin
Gishu
Maasai,
Nandi,
Elgeyo
and
Tugen
peoples
have
each
made
seasonal
or
irregular
use
of
the
forest
resources,
gathering
forest
produce
for
themselves,
using
the
forest
glades
to
graze
their
animals,
and
clearing
and
cultivating
areas
of
scrub-
land
on
the
forest
fringes.
Various
Africans
have
taken
up
residence
in
the
forest
including
a
small
number
of
Dorobo
(Blackburn,
1974).
To
them
all
the
forest
has
had
considerable
strategic
importance,
and
all
were
in
some
senses
dependent
upon
access
to
it
(Matson,
1972;
Ander-
son,
1982;
Waller,
1985).
The
forest
was
not,
then,
a
'tribal'
land
during
the
colonial
period
(or
previously).
Rather,
it
was
a
zone
of
ethnic
indeterminance,
over
which
no
single
group
exercised
exclusive
control.
As
we
shall
see,
the
demands
of
colonial
administration
helped
to
bring
this
situation
to
an
end,
with
the
Tugen
of
Baringo
District
asserting
their
dominance
over
the
forest.
Commerce
and
conservation
The
forests
of
the
Mau,
Nandi
Plateau,
and
the
slopes
of
Mt
Elgon
contain
hundreds
of
thousands
of
magnificent
conifers
juniper
and
yew.
The
timber
of
the
juniper
is
to
all
intents
and
purposes
like
cedar-wood.
The
mere
thinning
of
these
woods
which
is
necessary
for
their
improvement,
and
which
might
be
252
D.Anderson
carried
out
concurrently
with
the
establishment
of
European
settlements,
would
provide
millions
of
cubic
feet
of
timber,
which
would
find
a
ready
market
on
the
east
coast
of
Africa.
(Johnston,
1902:
291-2)
Sir
Harry
Johnston's description
of
the
potentials
of
forestry
was
typical
of
the
optimism
that
brought
European
settlers
to
East
Africa
in
the
early
years
of
this
century.
Seldom
substantiated
by
anything
more
than
the
passing
glance
of
the
traveller's
eye,
large
tracts
of
East
Africa
were
heralded
as
being
rich
in
the
resources
that,
with
some
initial
investment,
could
support
a
new
white
settler
colony.
Among
the
greatest
supporters
of
this
view
of
the
future
was
the
High
Commissioner
for
East
Africa
from
1900
to
1904,
Sir
Charles
Eliot.
Aware
that
investment
on
a
large
scale
would
be
necessary
to
establish
the
new
colony
on
a
sound
footing,
Eliot
used
his
position
to
encourage
'men
of
capital',
by
offering
land
concessions
on
highly
favourable
terms
(Sorrenson,
1968).
Among
the
early
proposals
this
attracted
was
one
for
the
establishment
of
a
timber
industry
in
the
Lembus
Forest.
Responding
enthusiastically
to
this
prop-
osition,
Eliot
pressed
quickly
ahead
with
the
negotiations
of
a
concession-
ary
lease,
without
seeking
advice from
within
his
own
Forest
Department.
By
the
time
of
Eliot's
resignation
in
1904,
the
government
found
itself
committed
to
the
granting
of
a
substantial
forestry
concession
to
a
small
group
of
businessmen,
with
Canadian
and
South
African
connections,
headed
by
Ewart
Grogan.
2
In
his
haste
to
secure
forestry
investment
in
the
colony,
Eliot
had
placed
substantial
powers
in
the
hands
of
the
concessionaires,
largely
ignoring
the
requirements
of
the
Forest
Department
and
giving
govern-
ment
very
little
control
over
the
working
of
the
concession.
The
Forest
Department
now
foresaw
huge
difficulties
in
administering
any
pro-
gramme
of
reafforestation
in
Lembus
under
the
terms
of
the
lease,
and
bemoaned
the
loss
of
revenue
that
would
attend
the
working
of
the
concession
at
the
extremely
low
royalties
stipulated.
From
1904
to
1916
the
Forest
Department
conducted
protracted
negotiations
with
Major
Grogan,
the
concessionaire,
in
a
belated
attempt
to
recoup
the
situation.
Grogan
naturally
wished
to
retain
the
powers
granted
in
the
original
agreement,
and
shrewdly
maintained
his
position.
The
government
found
itself
in
an
unpleasant
predicament.
While
keen
to
encourage
investment
in
the
development
of
a
timber
industry,
the
government
found
that
the
forest
concession
lay
at
the
centre
of
a
tangled
web
of
land
dealings
involving
Grogan,
none
of
which
seemed
to
accrue
any
great
benefit
to
the
government
or
the
colony.
The
most
worrying
of
these
was
Grogan's
claim
to
100
acres
of
valuable
wharfage
at
Kilindini
Harbour,
Mombasa,
which
had
been
secured
by
Grogan
as
part
of
the
forest
concession.
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
253
While
Grogan
traded
one
proposal
against
another,
and
the
Forest
Department
pressed
for
a
foreclosure
of
the
lease,
the
government,
aware
of
consequences
broader
than
the
considerations
of
the
Forest
Department,
sought
to
find
the
best
political
accommodation.'
When
the
renegotiated
lease
was
finally
signed
in
March
1916,
the
considerations
of
good
forestry
practice
were
indeed
sacrificed
to
bring
a
settlement
that
would
encourage
investment
in
the
timber
industry.
Grogan
won
exceedingly
favourable
terms
for
his
concession,
not
sub-
stantially
altered
from
the
original
lease,
giving
him
considerable
advan-
tages
over
other
sawmillers
in
East
Africa
and
leaving
his
operations
in
Lembus
largely
beyond
the
control
of
the
Forest
Department.`
The
Conservator
of
Forests
was
appalled
by
the
freedom
given
to
the
concessionaire
under
the
terms
finally
agreed.
5
The
reasons
for
his
out-
rage
were
partly
commercial
and
partly
conservationist.
Colonial
forestry
in
Kenya,
as
throughout
British
Africa,
was
initially
modelled
on
the
example
of
India
(Unwin,
1920;
Stebbing,
1937).
During
the
second
half
of
the
nineteenth
century
Indian
forestry
had
been
established
on
a
sound
commercial
base,
raising
revenue
for
government
while
also
being
able
to
finance
extensive
programmes
of
reafforestation
(Stebbing,
1922).
Forestry
in
India
paid
for
itself,
and
from
this
position
of
strength
gained
support
in
government
circles
for
a
conservationist
strategy
that
would
ensure
continued
revenue
surpluses.
In
short,
commercial
viability
facili-
tated
conservation.
Indian-trained
foresters
were
recruited
to
the
African
colonies
in
the
hope
of
achieving
the
same
result,
but
it
became
apparent
that
the
lower
yield
of
merchantable
timber
in
the
majority
of
African
forests
made
it
impossible
to
generate
sustained
revenue
surpluses.
Unable
to
realise
their
revenue
raising
potential,
and
in
need
of
subsidy
in
order
to
mount
programmes
of
reafforestation
and
preservation,
Forest
Departments
came
to
be
seen
as
a
drain
on
the
limited financial
resources
of
the
colonial
state
in
Africa
(Stebbing,
1941;
Brasnett,
1942;
Ofcansky,
1984).
In
these
circumstances,
the
Lembus
concession
was
particularly
galling
to
the
Kenya
Forest
Department.
Not
only
was
the
Department
being
denied
income
because
of
the
ludicrously
low
rates
of
royalties
fixed
under
the
lease,
but
the
preservation
work
of
the
Department
was
being
hampered
by
the
manner
in
which
Grogan's
agents
and
contractors
were
exploiting
the
forest
(Nicholson,
1931).
To
understand
the
attitude
of
the
foresters
we
need
to
examine
more
closely
the
financial
arrange-
ments
under
the
Lembus
forest
lease,
and
the
working
of
the
lease
by
the
concessionaire.
An
important
feature
of
the
early
negotiations
over
the
Lembus
con-
cession
was
the
agreement
that
the
normal
royalties
payable
to
govern-
254
D.
Anderson
ment
on
all
merchantable
timber
extracted
from
the
forest
would
be
set
at
a
reduced
rate.
Therefore,
despite
the
protests
of
the
Conservator
of
Forests,
the
final
agreement
of
1916
set
royalty
payments
at
only
two
rupees
per
100
cubic
feet
of
timber,
with
an
additional
sum
payable
on
each
acre
clear-felled.
These
rates
were
less
than
half
those
payable
by
sawmillers
working
other
Kenyan
forests.
After
1919,
when
sawmilling
concessions
were
granted
only
by
competitive
tender,
the
disparity
bet-
ween
the
terms
operating
in
the
Lembus
concession
and
elsewhere
in
the
colony
became
even
more
marked.
In
1928,
Grogan's
sawmillers
were
paying
only
six
cents
per
cubic
foot
of
timber,
while
sawmillers
elsewhere
in
Kenya
paid
50
cents
per
cubic
foot.
Furthermore,
Grogan's
agents
Equator
Sawmills
Ltd
(ESM)
paid
a
fixed
annual
licence
fee
of
KShs
12,000/-
(initially
6,000
rupees),
against
which
royalty
payments
were
offset.
Timber
to
the
royalty
value
of
KShs
12,000/-
had
therefore
to
be
felled
before
the
Department
saw
any
revenue
on
the
timber
extracted
from
the
concession.
6
By
the
mid-1920s
ESM
were
extracting
more
timber
than
all
other
Kenyan
sawmillers
put
together,
yet
were
paying
considerably
less
for
the
privilege
(Kenya
Forest
Department,
1919-28).
Forest
Department
antagonism
towards
ESM
was
deepened
further
by
the
suspicion
that
the
company
was
infringing
the
already
generous
terms
of
its
licence.
The
commercial
working
of
the
Lembus
concession
had
begun
prior
to
the
First
World
War,
but
due
to
shortages
of
finance
and
staff,
it
was
not
until
1921
that
the
Forest
Department
began
to
monitor
the
activities
of
ESM
(Kenya
Forest
Department,
1913-21).
Even
at
this
stage
the
only
detailed
map
of
the
forest
was
held
by
Major
Grogan,
having
been
drafted
by
a
surveyor
in
his
employment
in
1905.
This
gave
the
concessionaire
a
much
clearer
knowledge
of
the
potential
of
the
forest
than
had
the
Forest
Department.
7
The
unwillingness
of
ESM
to
furnish
the
Department
with
working
plans
for
Lembus
raised
the
suspicions
of
the
Conservator
of
Forests,
and
by
1923
he
had
unco-
vered
evidence
of
irregularities
in
ESM's
calculation
of
royalties
due
and
of
areas
clear-felled.
Certainly,
ESM
were
stretching
the
terms
of
the
lease
to
their
absolute
limit
in
order
to
delay
royalty
payment
and,
seemingly,
to
avoid
the
supervision
of
the
Forest
Department.
On
their
own
admission,
the
policy
of
the
company
was
'to
pick
the
eyes
out
of
the
forest',
rather
than
to
clear-fe11.
8
Consequently,
when
the
Department
sought
to
reafforest
areas
that
they
believed
ESM
to
have
clear-felled,
they
invariably
discovered
that
trees
had
been
left
standing.
By
claiming
that
these
areas
were
not
in
fact
clear-felled
ESM
avoided
making
any
payment,
while
also
preventing
the
Forest
Department
from
getting
on
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
255
with
its
programme
of
reafforestation
(under
a
clause
that
gave
the
company
rights
to
re-enter
any
areas
not
clear-felled
for
a
further
20
years
after
their
original
working).
9
The
Forest
Department
relentlessly
pursued
ESM
over
these
practices
throughout
the
1920s,
while
pressing
for
the
Attorney-General
to
declare
foreclosure
on
the
concession,
in
view
of
the
company's
infringements
of
the
lease.
As
a
result
of
this
pressure,
ESM
were
compelled
to
submit
monthly
returns
on
their
activities
in
the
forest,
to
settle
outstanding
royalties,
and
to
hand
over
a
number
of
clear-felled
areas
to
the
Depart-
ment
for
replanting.
But,
while
it
was
widely
acknowledged
by
the
late
1920s
that
the
forest
concession
had
been
a
serious
error,
the
government
was
not
prepared
to
challenge
Major
Grogan
by
attempting
to
terminate
the
agreement.
Further
opportunities
to
terminate
the
lease
occurred
during
the
1930s,
as
economic
recession
descended
upon
the
timber
trade
and
upon
Kenya
(Kenya
Forest
Department,
1930-34).
Although
the
advantages
of
low
royalties
allowed
the
Lembus
concessionaires
to
weather
the
depression
better
than
their
competitors,
from
1933
financial
difficulties
prevented
them
from
making
full
payment
of
the
annual
licence
fee
.
11
Non-payment
of
the
licence
fee
was
a
specific
clause
under
which
government
had
power
to
terminate
the
lease,
but
wider
political
concerns
again
prevailed
over
the
demands
of
the
Forest
Department:
in
the
circumstances
of
the
depression,
the
Kenya
government
was
more
intent
on
persuading
businesses
to
remain
in
the
colony
than
on
seeking
ways
of
expelling
them.
The
Forest
Department
had
succeeded
in
assert-
ing
a
degree
of
control
over
the
management
of
Lembus,
yet
one
of
Kenya's
potentially
richest
forests
continued
to
add
only
negligibly
to
the
revenues
of
the
Department
(see
Table
12.1).
While
the
commercial
arrangements
in
the
Lembus
remained
of
grave
concern
to
the
Forest
Department,
the
broader
prospects
for
forest
conservation
improved
considerably
during
the
1930s.
Inspired
by
a
var-
iety
of
motives,
public
opinion
in
the
colony
became
more
conscious
of
the
need
for
government
to
take
an
active
role
in
implementing
conser-
vation
measures
(Anderson,
1984).
With
greater
public
attention
focused
upon
questions
of
land
use
and
environmental
degradation,
the
Forest
Department
immediately
benefited
from
the
emphasis
given
to
the
impor-
tance
of
forest
cover
in
relation
to
fears
about
soil
erosion.
Lively
public
debate
on
matters
of
conservation,
much
of
it
conducted
through
the
newly
formed
Arbor
Society,
improved
the
image
and
status
of
the
Forest
Department,
so
that
by
the
end
of
the
1930s
opinion
was
very
much
in
favour
of
stronger
policies
for
forest
protection
(Ward,
1937;
Anderson,
1982,
1984;
Murray,
1982).
These
concerns
were
reflected
in
the
promi-
256
D.
Anderson
Table
12.1
Equator
Sawmills
Ltd:
timber
milled
and
royalty
payments,
1912-36
Timber
milled
(cu.ft.)
Royalty
payment
(incl.
licence
fee)a
1912
56,450
6,000
rupee
1913
52,758
6,000
rupee
1914
143,166
6,000
rupee
1915
282,703
6,000
rupee
1916
151,175
6,000
rupee
1917
99,020
6,000
rupee
1918
90,701
6,000
rupee
1919
188,262
6,000
rupee
1920
176,926
6,000
florin
1921
222,186
13,313
sh
1922
462,249
14,103
sh
1923
47,590
b
12,000
sh
1924
121,111
12,000
sh
1925
223,260
14,467
sh
1926
397,148
25,150
sh
1927
582,102
36,163
sh
1928
475,279
30,363
sh
1929
548,723
33,594
sh
1930
498,239
30,500
sh
1931
167,809
12,000
sh
1932
83,324
12,000
sh
1933
111,600
12,000sh
1934
109,357
12,000sh
1935
?
12,000sh
1936
?
12,000sh
a
From
1912
to
1920
the
licence
fee
was
6,000
rupees
p.a.
In
1920
it
was
6,000
florins,
and
from
1921
onwards
it
was
12,000
shillings
p.a.
b
The
mills
were
shut
down
for
part
of
1923
because
of
a
collapse
in
the
timber
market.
Source:
Kenya
NationalArchives,
various
Forest
Department
and
Attorney-Gen-
eral
files
for
the
period
1902-39.
nent
role
played
by
the
Forest
Department
in
the
rural
development
plans
implemented
after
1945,
many
of
which
were
organised
on
the
basis
of
catchment
areas.
One
such
scheme
was
centred
on
the
Lembus
Forest,
at
the
head
of
the
Perkerra
River
catchment.
Protection
of
Lem-
bus,
and
of
the
other
forests
around
it,
was
accordingly
given
the
highest
priority
in
planning
the
future
pattern
of
African
land
use
and
husbandry
throughout
the
entire
catchment.
This
gave
the
Forest
Department
the
political
authority
after
1945
to
exercise
much
greater
control
over
com-
mercial
activities
in
Lembus
(Kenya,
1950;
ALDEV,
1962).
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
257
Table
12.2
Kenya
Forest
Department:
war-time
revenue,
1938-45
Revenue
(i)
Expenditure
(f)
Surplus
(f)
1938
41,550
31,323
10,227
1939
43,702
31,051
12,651
1940
57,170
30,800
26,370
1941
75,136
29,473
45,663
1942
119,020
36,608
82,412
1943
140,492
45,646
94,846
1944
142,079
60,920
81,159
1945
156,314
74,363
81,951
Source:
Kenya
Forest
Department
Annual
Reports,
1938-47.
The
enhanced
status
of
the
Forest
Department
was
also
bolstered
in
hard
financial
terms
by
the
boom
in
timber
trading
during
the
Second
World
War.
Timber
production
in
the
colony
climbed
from
19,750
Hoppus
tons
in
1938
to
116,500
Hoppus
tons
in
1945,
and
in
the
Lembus
Forest
alone
a
further
six
mills
came
into
operation.
Although
this
brief
period
of
rampant
exploitation
left
'chaotic
conditions'
in
many
forests,
the
revenue
gained
by
the
Department
was
substantial
(see
Table
12.2)
(Kenya
Forest
Department,
1945-7).
Concern
over
forest
conservation
worked
to
strengthen
the
financial
position
of
the
Department
at
this
time
with
the
establishment
of
a
Forestry
Sinking
Fund,
an
initiative
unique
to
Kenya.
Taking
the
surplus
revenue
raised
for
1940
as
the
base
line,
all
annual
revenues
raised
by
the
Department
above
the
1940
figure
were
placed
in
the
Sinking
Fund,
to
be
used
to
replenish
and
develop
the
forests
exploited
during
the
wartime
boom.
By
the
end
of
the
war
the
Sinking
Fund
stood
at
over
£300,000
(Gardner,
1942;
Graham,
1945;
Kenya
Forest
Department,
1945-7).
The
Forest
Department
was
in
a
financially
and
politically
healthy
position
for
the
first
time,
largely
due
to
the
emergence
of
broader
concerns
over
environmental
protection
(Logie,
1962).
It
might
be
said,
then,
that
this
marked
the
victory
of
the
conser-
vationist
aims
of
the
Forest
Department
over
the
commercial
aims
of
the
timber
company.
However,
the
important
relationship
between
the
successful
commercial
exploitation
of
the
forest
resource
during
the
war
and
the
subsequent
implementation
of
improved
forestry
protection
mea-
sures
must
be
stressed.
There
was
no
necessary
contradiction
between
commerce
and
conservation,
so
long
as
the
foresters
were
able
to
utilise
the
former
to
achieve
the
latter.
From
the
Forest
Department's
viewpoint,
the
Lembus
Forest
concession
was
undesirable
because
it
made
this
258
D.Anderson
difficult.
After
1945
the
operation
of
the
lease
continued,
and
although
the
controls
enforced
by
the
Department
were
improved
they
were
still
by
no
means
complete.
The
reassertion
of
forest
conservation
in
Lembus
had
only
been
made
possible
by
a
growing
political
will
in
government
to
protect
the
environment.
But
the
conservation
policies
enforced
as
part
of
the
post-war
development
effort
in
Kenya
were
not
always
greeted
enthusiastically
by
the
Africans
on
whose
lives
they
impinged.
As
far
as
many
Africans
were
concerned,
conservation
for
the
public
good
meant
only
the
restriction
of
their
private
rights;
rights
to
graze
their
animals,
to
cultivate,
and
to
cut
timber
and
fuelwood.
Africans
making
use
of
the
forest
resources
of
Lembus
were
particularly
energetic
in
defending
those
rights
and
it
is
this
aspect
of
the
conservation
history
of
Lembus
that
we
will
now
consider.
Conservation
and
African
rights
The
question
of
'native
rights'
in
Lembus
had
been
raised
during
the
early
negotiations
between
the
government
and
Major
Grogan.
The
government
was
concerned
to
ensure
that
Africans
living
within
the
area
of
the
concession
would
be
permitted
to
continue
to
utilise
the
forest
for
their
livelihood.
As
Major
Grogan
was
of
the
opinion
that
the
forest
was
'virtually
uninhabited',
other
than
by
a
small
number
of
Dorobo
families,
he
raised
no
objection
to
a
clause
being
included
in
the
terms
of
the
lease
protecting
the
rights
of
these
few
'traditional'
forest
dwellers
(Kenya
Land
Commission,
1934).
12
However,
during
the
final
stages
of
the
re-negotiation
of
the
lease
June
1913
to
March
1916
dispute
arose
over
the
precise
extent
of
such
rights.
A
compromise
was
eventually
agreed,
that
the
Governor
should,
in
the
near
future,
'be
required
to
endeavour
to
ascertain
and
define
the
nature
and
extent
of
free
grazing
rights
and
other
such
customary
rights
as
may
have
been
exercised
in
the
[forest]
prior
to
the
dates
of
the
concession'.
13
This
clause
was
not
immediately
acted
upon,
but
once
Grogan's
agents
began
to
work
the
forest
more
intensively
it
became
apparent
that
the
numbers
of
Africans
occupying
Lembus
were
much
greater
than
had
been
supposed.
While
the
timber
contractors
and
the
Forest
Department
shared
the
view
that
these
were
'unauthorised
persons'
who
should
be
removed
from
the
forest,
the
District
Administration
at
Eldama
Ravine
insisted
that
little
could
be
done
until
a
formal
definition
of
native
rights
in
the
forest
was
proclaimed
by
the
Governor.
14
In
December
1923,
after
a
census
of
the
forest
had
been
conducted,
Governor
Coryndon
issued
his
definition
of
native
rights
in
Lembus.
Managing
the
forest:
Lem
bus,
Kenya
259
This
document,
known
as
the
Coryndon
Definition,
laid
down
eleven
specific
rights,
including
the
rights
to
construct
dwellings,
to
graze
ani-
mals,
to
cultivate,
and
to
gather
forest
produce.These
rights
were
granted
to
all
those
Africans
who
were
able
to
satisfy
the
administration
that
they
had
enjoyed
rights
within
the
forest
'according
to
native
law
and
custom',
prior
to
the
initial
signing
of
the
lease.
Appended
to
the
Coryn-
don
Definition
was
a
full
list
of
all
African
`Right-Holders',
as
they
now
became
known.
The
list
was
viewed
with
horror
by
both
Major
Grogan
and
the
Forest
Department,
for
it
identified
no
fewer
than
485
Tugen
and
11
Dorobo
right-holding
families,
and
further
stipulated
that
such
rights
were
to
be
passed
down
to
the
descendants
of
each
right-holder
named.
With
the
children
of
listed
right-holders
already
numbering
650,
and
around
40
per
cent
of
the
adult
males
listed
either
unmarried
or
married
but
as
yet
without
children,
it
was
clear
that
the
future
manage-
ment
of
the
forest
was
going
to
be
problematic.
15
The
Coryndon
Definition
remained
a
bone
of
contention
throughout
the
colonial
period.
To
the
Africans
of
Lembus
it
was
a
charter
of
unde-
niable
rights
to
be
exercised
in
perpetuity;
an
absolute
guarantee
of
their
security
in
the
forest.
To
the
sawmillers
and
to
the
foresters
it
represented
a
serious
hindrance
to
the
economic
and
ecological
management
of
the
forest.
The
scene
for
political
confrontation
was
set,
with
both
the
timber
company
and
the
Forest
Department,
though
with
differing
motives,
seeking
to
exploit
other
clauses
in
the
lease
to
place
firmer
controls
upon
the
right-holders
and
ultimately
to
press
for
new
legislation
that
would
override
the
terms
of
the
Definition.
There
was
also
discontent
among
the
Africans
living
on
lands
surrounding
Lembus
regarding
the
implications
of
the
Definition,
for
by
securing
the
rights
of
those
families
listed
in
the
Coryndon
Definition
the
Governor
had
effectively
closed
the
forest
to
all
others.
From
being
a
zone
of
ethnic
indeterminance,
the
forest
had
become,
de
jure,
the
rightful
home
of
a
clearly
defined
section
of
the
Tugen.
Many
other
Tugen
and
Elgeyo
who
made
periodic
use
of
the forest,
but
were
not
listed
as
right-holders,
now
found
them-
selves
legally
excluded
from
the
forest.
This
effective
exclusion
of
the
occasional
and
irregular
users
of
the
forest
mainly
other
Tugen
and
Elgeyo
inhabiting
lands
adjacent
to
Lembus
came
at
a
time
when
three
related
factors
combined
to
make
access
to
the
resources
of
the
forest
increasingly
important.
Firstly,
during
the
mid-1920s
the
administration
completed
the
final
demarcation
of
the
Native
Reserves,
the
parcels
of
land
within
which
it
hoped
to
confine
each
African
group.
African
populations
either
remained
resident
in
their
designated
Native
Reserve,
or
took
temporary
labour
contracts
on
European
farms.
These
moves
towards
the
establishment
of
boundaries
260
D.
Anderson
and
the
control
of
the
movement
of
Africans
and
their
livestock
across
those
boundaries
served
to
accentuate
the
role
of
the
forest
as
a
place
of
refuge
(Murray,
1982).
Africans
wishing
to
move
livestock
around
from
one
area
to
another,
and
particularly
those
with
labour
contracts
seeking
to
smuggle
extra
cattle
onto
European
farmlands,
did
so
under
cover
of
the
forests.
Strategically
placed
at
the
heart
of
the
White
High-
lands
between
several
European
farming
areas,
and
coupled
with
the
advantages
of
concealment
and
good
grazing,
the
Lembus
Forest
became
a
particularly
important
entrepot
for
Africans
and
their
livestock.
Sec-
ondly,
between
1925
and
1936
a
series
of
droughts
affected
the
Baringo
Plains,
to
the
east
of
Lembus,
and
over
the
same
period
locust
invasions
damaged
grazing
in
parts
of
the
Elgeyo
Reserve
to
the
north
of
Lembus,
and
in
southern
Baringo
(Anderson,
1984).
Herders
hard
pressed
for
grazing
in
these
areas
made
greater
use
of
the
forest
glades,
particularly
during
the
dry
seasons,
and
there
is
evidence
that
stockowners
commonly
`loaned'
animals
to
friends
and
relatives
among
the
Lembus
right-
holders.
At
times
of
drought
the
forest
was
a
crucial
resource
to
pas-
toralists
on
the
neighbouring
plains
(Anderson,
1982).
Thirdly,
in
1929
the
colonial
administration
in
Baringo
initiated
a
programme
for
the
reconditioning
of
pasture
on
the
plains
to
the
east
of
Lembus.
This
was
prompted
by
anxieties
over
land
degradation,
believed
to
be
caused
by
the
overstocking
of
the
area.
The
success
of
the
reconditioning
pro-
gramme
depended
upon
the
restriction
of
the
number
of
animals
allowed
back
into
reconditioned
areas
once
the
reseeding
of
pasture
was
com-
plete.
To
accomplish
this
cattle
counts
had
to
be
conducted,
and
attempts
made
to
encourage
the
Tugen
to
accept
the
necessity
of
destocking.
The
Tugen
herders
naturally
distrusted
a
process
that
seemed
effectively
to
result
in
the
enforced
reduction
of
their
livestock
holdings.
Their
response
was
pragmatic.
While
their
spokesmen
accepted
the
pronouncements
of
the
administration,
each
Tugen
herder
was
busy
depositing
as
many
livestock
as
he
could
around
his
kinsmen
in
those
locations
as
yet
un-
affected
by
reconditioning
(Anderson,
1982).
The
Lembus
Forest,
with
its
population
of
right-holders,
was
the
perfect
destination
for
livestock
displaced
from
southern
Baringo
by
reconditioning
schemes
and
the
threat
of
destocking.
At
a
time
when
government
policy
was
aimed
at
removing
Africans
from
the
forests,
the
legal
residents
of
Lembus
were
therefore
a
striking
anomaly.
With
right-holders
legitimately
entitled
to
graze
cattle
in
the
forest,
it
was
difficult
for
the
administration
to
detect
the
presence
of
cattle
belonging
to
non-right-holders.
Suspicion
that
the
forest
was
heav-
ily
used
in
this
way
by
non-right-holders
was
confirmed
by
occasional
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
261
police
raids,
one
such
raid
on
Torongo
Glade
in
1929
uncovering
more
than
400
head
of
cattle
herded
illegally
in
the
forest.
16
All
of
this
placed
the
Lembus
right-holders
in
something
of
a
predica-
ment,
for
while
the
Coryndon
Definition
protected
their
status
it
also
threatened
the
viability
of
the
regional
economy.
The
forest
economy
was
based
upon
the
cultivation
of
cereals
within
the
forest,
and
the
dynamics
of
movement
between
the
forest
glades
and
the
surrounding
lowland
grazing
areas.
Forest
grazing
and
forest
cereals
were
critical
dry-season
reserves
for
the
peoples
over
the
surrounding
region.
Short-
term
(i.e.
seasonal)
and
longer-term
fluctuations
in
the
utilisation
of
the
forest
could
therefore
be
considerable,
with
forest
resources
being
under
greatest
pressure
during
prolonged
periods
of
drought.
These
were
the
conditions
prevailing
in
the
years
following
the
Coryndon
Definition,
the
enforcement
of
which
implicitly
demanded
the
breaking
of
economic
linkages
between
the
forest
and
its
neighbouring
areas.
While
the
right-
holders
were
happy
to
accept
the
guarantee
of
their
security,
they
could
not
isolate
themselves
from
the
local
economy.
The
influx
of
people
and
livestock
into
the
forest
throughout
the
1930s
were
stimulated
both
by
the
importance
of
the
forest
within
the
regional
economy,
and
by
the
privileged
status
enjoyed
by
the
right-holders.
The
predicament
this
held
for
the
right-holders
was
exposed
towards
the
end
of
the
1930s,
as
the
Forest
Department
mounted
wider
programmes
for
reafforestation
and
forest
preservation.
°
By
the
early
1930s
regular
complaints
from
ESM
of
shortages
of
grazing
for
their
working
oxen,
and
reports
from
the
Forest
Officer
that
the
acreage
under
cultivation
was
steadily
increasing,
indicated
that
the
Afri-
cans
of
Lembus
were
exploiting
the
Coryndon
Definition
to
the
ful
ls
The
efforts
of
the
Forest
Department
to
remedy
this
situation
stirred
the
Tugen
of
Lembus
into
political
action.
Initially,
Forest
Officers
simply
tried
to
close
parts
of
the
forest
to
African
grazing
and
cultivation,
but
the
District
Administration
pointed
out
that
this
infringed
the
rights
set
out
in
the
Coryndon
Definition.
19
By
1938,
strengthened
by
the
growing
conservation
lobby
in
the
colony,
the
Forest
Department
challenged
the
legality
of
the
Definition
by
framing
rules
under
the
Forest
Ordinance
that
gave
them
the
power
to
restrict
the
numbers
of
animals
in
particular
forest
glades,
control
which
areas
could
be
cleared
for
cultivation,
and
remove
people
and
livestock
from
areas
where
reafforestation
program-
mes
were
to
go
ahead.
20
These
measures
were
similar
to
regulations
then
being
applied
in
other
parts
of
Kenya
in
connection
with
soil
conservation
and
grazing
control,
but
once
again
the
District
Administration
stepped
in
to
uphold
the
special
status
of
the
Lembus
right-holders.
By
this
time
262
D.Anderson
the
Tugen
of
Lembus
were
well
aware
of
the
significance
of
the
Coryndon
Definition,
and
the
administration
were
accordingly
concerned
that
any
attempt
to
curtail
forest
rights
in
Lembus
would
have
serious
political
repercussions.
These
differences
of
opinion
between
the
Forest
Depart-
ment
and
the
District
Administration
were
immediately
apparent
to
the
Tugen,
who
found
that
orders
and
advice
from
one
wing
of
government
were
contradicted
and
countermanded
by
another.
Skilfully
playing
one
side
against
the
other,
the
leaders
of
the
Lembus
Tugen
were
able
to
exploit
the
politics
of
conservation
in
the
forest.
Facing
opposition
from
the
District
Administration,
and
hostility
from
the
Tugen,
the
Forest
Department
was
unable
to
implement
its
conservation
programme
in
Lembus.
21
This
postponement
was
prolonged
by
the
Second
World
War,
during
which
non-right-holders
enjoyed
a
further
period
of
unhampered
access
to
the
forest.
By
1946
the
Lembus
Tugen
had
taken
advantage
of
the
interregnum
in
administrative
decision-making
brought
about
by
the
war
to
organise
themselves
against
the
threat
posed
by
the
Forest
Depart-
ment.
Two
main
issues
had
galvanised
the
right-holders
towards
a
more
organised
defence
of
their
position.
The
first
concerned
the
failure
of
the
Forest
Department
to
provide
shops,
schools,
medical
dispensaries
and
other
services
within
the
forest,
facilities
for
which
the
Lembus
residents
paid
a
supplementary
tax.
Because
of
the
unwillingness
of
the
Department
to
provide
these
services
in
the
area
worked
under
the
concession,
by
the
mid-1940s
the
right-holders
still
lacked
any
of
the
services
that
their
taxes
were
supposed
to
pay
for,
and
that
were
by
then
common
in
other
African
locations.
This
failure
was
deeply
resented
by
the
right-holders.
The
second
issue
concerned
the
arrangements
to
be
made
for
Lembus
on
the
termination
of
the
forest
lease
in
1959.
The
right-holders
were
determined
to
avoid
full
control
of
the
forest
passing
to
the
Forest
Department,
whose
activities
they
now
viewed
as
entirely
hostile
to
their
own
interests.
Also,
the
right-holders
wished
to
ensure
that
their
rights
would
be
recognised
beyond
the
expiry
of
the
lease.
These
issues
formed
the
basis
of
a
campaign
now
initiated
by
the
right-
holders
for
the
excision
of
the
Lembus
Forest
from
the
forest
reserve,
to
become
part
of
Baringo
District.
22
To
assert
firmly
their
claim
to
Lembus,
the
Tugen
right-holders
embarked
upon
this
campaign
by
exercising
their
rights
in
the
forest
to
the
full.
Between
1945
and
1948
the
'alarming'
increase
in
the
level
of
cultivation
in
Lembus
prompted
the
Forest
Department
to
threatenTugen
cultivators
with
prosecution
under
the
1941
Forest
Ordinance.
District
Commissioner
Simpson,
again
upholding
the
Coryndon
Definition,
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
263
thought
this
inadvisable.
Commenting
upon
past
arrangements
made
on
an
ad
hoc
basis
by
the
Forest
Department
to
prevent
the
right-holders
from
cultivating
parts
of
the
forest
required
for
reafforestation,
he
noted
that,
.
none
of
these
arrangements
has
had
the
force
of
legal
sanction
behind
them
.
.
.
Thus,
to
prosecute
without
being
assured
of
a
conviction
and
with
acquittal
resulting
would,
I
am
certain,
open
the
eyes
of
the
Tugen
to
the
fact
that
they
have
been
fooled
for
years,
and
that
until
rules
are
framed
and
made
law,
they
can
exercise
their
'rights'
indiscriminately
to
the
detriment
of
the
forest
and
to
the
loss
of
power
behind
administrative
order.
23
The
Tugen
right-holders
were
already
aware
that
the
government
were
hamstrung
by
the
terms
of
the
Coryndon
Definition.
In
August
1948,
Simpson
again
wrote
warningly
to
the
Forest
Department:
'In
view
of
the
fact
that
the
Tugen
in
the
Lembus
Forest
intend
to
make
a
political
issue
of
its
future,
it
is
essential
that
we
proceed
now
strictly
according
to
the
law'.
24
But
which
law,
the
Forest
Ordinance
or
the
Coryndon
Definition?
At
this
time
the
Forest
Department
came
to
play
a
more
prominent
role
in
the
planning
of
rural
development
in
Kenya,
but
ironically,
just
as
forest
preservation
became
central
to
government
development
plans,
events
in
Lembus
conspired
to
make
the
implementation
of
forest
policies
virtually
impossible.
From
1948
to
1951
the
Tugen
campaign
gained
momentum,
culminating
in
May
1951
with
the
Lembus
locational
Council
sending
a
petition
on
the
matter
directly
to
the
Secretary
of
State.
By
this
time
the
Lembus
question
had
become
embroiled
in
nationalist
politics,
with
representatives
of
the
leading
African
political
party,
the
Kenya
African
Union
(KAU),
visiting
the
forest
to
speak
at
public
meet-
ings.
The
prospect
of
action
by
the
Forest
Department
to
enforce
husban-
dry
rules
in
Lembus
'stirring
up
the
KAU'
and
contributing
to
serious
unrest
now
seemed
very
rea1.
25
A
census
of
the
forest,
completed
in
August
1951,
did
nothing
to
alleviate
the
administration's
sense
of
impend-
ing
doom:
there
were
now
no
fewer
than
920
legitimate
right-holders
and
their
families,
300
of
whom
actually
resided
outside
the
forest
but
still
determinedly
exercised
their
rights
in
Lembus.
These
people
there-
fore
exploited
their
status
as
right-holders
to
cultivate
lands
within
the
forest
as
well
as
lands
in
the
neighbouring
Native
Reserve.
26
With
political
tension
mounting
in
Kenya
throughout
1952
as
the
Mau
Mau
crisis
unfolded,
the
administration
were
pushed
into
direct
consul-
tations
with
the
Lembus
Tugen
in
the
hope
of
finding
a
political
settle-
ment.
A
'Working
Committee',
with
four
African
members
was
set
up
in
August
1952
to
solve
the
problems
of
the
right-holders,
but
this
came
264
D.Anderson
too
late
to
salvage
the
Forest
Department's
conservation
strategy
for
Lembus.
The
following
month
J.
M.
ole
Tameno,
an
African
Member
of
the
Kenya
Legislative
Council,
wrote
formally
to
the
Chief
Native
Commissioner,
declaring
his
fear
of
'genuine
unrest'
in
Lembus,
and
accusing
the
government
of
giving
'twisting
answers'
to
the
Tugen
to
avoid
telling
the
truth
about
their
rights
and
about
plans
for
the
future
of
the
forest.
On
5
November
1952,
only
a
fortnight
following
the
Decla-
ration
of
Emergency
in
Kenya,
Tameno
tabled
a
question
in
the
Legisla-
tive
Council
on
unrest
in
Lembus.
27
The
political
point
was
timely,
for
a
recent
ruling
by
the
Solicitor-General,
that
the
right-holders
should
be
regarded
as
tenants-at-will,
had
given
the
Forest
Department
the
necessary
powers
to
override
the
Coryndon
Definition
and
evict
the
Tugen
from
Lembus.
However,
the
government
were
now
very
concerned
to
avoid
confrontation
in
Lembus,
and
the
legal
victory
of
the
Forest
Department
was
lost
amid
the
political
realities
of
the
situation.
'What-
ever
the
legal
position
may
now
be',
wrote
the
District
Officer
in
1952,
`even
if
we
could
evict
these
people,
we
have
nowhere
to
put
them'.
28
With
the
legal
solution
they
had
so
long
struggled
to
achieve
now
denied
them
by
the
government's
unwillingness
to
provoke
further
poli-
tical
unrest
in
Lembus,
the
Forest
Department
turned
to
ecological
arguments.
Backed
by
the
African
Land
Development
Board,
the
Forest
Department
insisted
that
to
give
way
on
husbandry
rules
in
Lembus
placed
the
whole
development
effort
in
the
Perkerra
catchment
in
jeopardy.
By
exercising
their
individual
rights,
the
inhabitants
of
Lembus
were
accentuating
erosion
and
degradation
throughout
the
catchment.
29
This
stand
for
strong
conservation
management
in
Lembus
won
the
Forest
Department
many
supporters,
but
only
served
to
delay
the
now
inevitable
decision
to
find
a
practical
and
workable
political
solution
to
the
Lembus
problem.
Although
the
forest
was
seriously
overcrowded,
and
the
lands
to
the
east
in
Baringo
were
badly
overgrazed,
it
was
clear
that
none
of
the
right-holders
would
meekly
accept
eviction
from
the
forest.
Political
expediency
prevailed
over
ecological
considerations.
At
a
meeting
of
all
sections
of
the
administration
involved
in
Lembus,
held
in
March
1956,
the
Forest
Department
was
finally
forced
to
face
the
harsh
political
reality.
The
meeting
accepted
the
Tugen's
historical
claim
to
Lembus,
emphasising
that
current
political
aspects
were
'most
important'
in
evaluating
the
situation.
Thus,
the
Tugen
had
successfully
`tribalised'
the
Lembus
Forest.
It
was
therefore
agreed
that
control
of
the
forest
should
revert
to
the
Baringo
African
District
Council
upon
the
termination
of
the
Grogan
concession
in
1959,
as
'any
other
course
of
action
would
meet
with
the
bitterest
opposition
from
the
whole
tribe
and
might
well
require
a
levy
force
to
impose
government
orders
upon
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
265
the
people'.
In
other
words,
it
was
felt
that
Forest
Department
husbandry
rules
could
only
be
applied
by
coercion.
More
generally,
it
was
recognised
that
to
destock
the
forest
glades
and
to
control
excessive
cultivation
and
deforestation,
would
be
'well
nigh
impossible'
without
accommodating
the
wishes
of
the
people
.The
victory
of
the
right-holders
was
complete.'
Conclusion
Although
the
granting
of
the
Grogan
concession
shaped
the
history
of
Lembus
in
a
unique
way,
the
subsequent
experience
of
the
Kenya
Forest
Department
in
their
attempts
to
manage
the
forest
offers
a
striking
illustration
of
the
conflicts
between
indigenous
forest
users,
commercial
forestry,
and
the
aims
of
forest
conservation.
Lacking
the
necessary
influence
in
political
decision-making
before
the
late
1940s,
the
require-
ments
of
the
Forest
Department
were
overlooked
firstly
in
the
granting
of
the
forest
lease,
and
then
in
the
definition
of
native
rights
within
the
forest.
While
these
decisions
made
the
management
of
the
forest
difficult,
it
was
the
growth
of
the
African
political
opposition
to
the
implementa-
tion
of
broader
colonial
regulations
governing
land
use
that
marked
the
final
defeat
for
the
Forest
Department's
policies
in
Lembus.
The
determi-
nation
of
the
colonial
government
to
transform
African
husbandry
after
1945
was
stimulated
and
justified
by
the
aims
of
conservation
(Cliffe,
1972;
Anderson,
1984;
Throup,
1985).
With
the
deeply
rooted
history
of
conflict
over
the
rights
of
Africans
in
the
forest,
it
is
hardly
surprising
that
Lembus
should
have
become
the
focal
point
of
political
opposition
to
colonial
conservation
policies.
In
many
respects
the
political
victory
of
the
Tugen
in
defending
their
rights
in
Lembus
should
be
applauded,
but
it
should
also
be
noted
that
conservation
was,
by
default,
a
casualty
of
this
struggle.
Conservation
measures
advocated
by
colonial
govern-
ments
were
often
stigmatised
in
the
eyes
of
Africans,
creating
a
resistance
to
the
enforcement
of
land
husbandry
rules
that
the
governments
of
independent
Africa
have
found
it
difficult
to
overcome.
The
failures
of
colonial
conservation
have
sometimes
left
a
powerful
and
undesirable
legacy.
Notes
1
G.S.
Cowley,
'Memorandum
on
Agricultural
Aspects
of
the
main
Forest-
free
areas
of
the
Lembus
Forest',
Kenya
National
Archives
(KNA)
PC/
NKU/2/1/31.
2
Eliot
to
Grant,
8
February
1904;
Hill
to
Eliot,
25
April
1904;
Linton
(Conservator
of
Forests),
'Lease
for
Timber
Cutting
at
Ravine',
May
1904;
266
D.Anderson
Grogan
to
Eliot,
2
June
1904;
and
'Original
Licence
for
Lembus
Forest
Concession',
15
July
1904,
all
in
KNA
AG
4/2313.
3
Crown
Advocate,
'Memo,
on
the
Lingham
and
Grogan
Timber
conces-
sion',
11
October
1910,
and
other
correspondence
in
KNA
AG
4/2313.
4
Acting
Conservator
of
Forests
to
Attorney-General,
3
November
1920,
`Copy
of
Forest
Lease,
1
March
1916',
and
related
correspondence
KNA
AG
4/2313.
5
Conservator
of
Forests
to
Senior
Commissioner/Kerio,
31
July
1925,
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/128,
for
a
summary
of
the
Department's
criticisms
of
ESM.
6
'Report
of
the
Select
Committee
of
the
Legislative
Council
appointed
to
consider
Forest
Royalties',
1919,
KNA
AG
4/919;
Crown
Advocate
to
Acting
Chief
Secretary,
23
April
1912
and
Conservator
of
Forests
to
Attor-
ney
General,
3
November
1920,
both
KNA
AG
4/2313;
Nicholson
to
Colonial
Secretary,
2
February
1928,
KNAARC(FOR)
7/2/128,
Kenya's
currency
was
counted
in
rupees
until
1920,
and
in
shillings
and
cents
from
1921.
7
'ESM
Ltd
Forest
Concession',
unsigned,
1923,
KNA
AG
4/2332.
Tannahill
to
Commissioner
of
Lands,
20
January
1921,
and
Acting
Chief
Secretary
to
Commissioner
of
Lands,
10
March
1921,
both
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/128.
8
ESM
to
Conservator
of
Forests,
26
February
1924,
and
Conservator
of
Forests
to
Senior
Commissioner/Kerio,
31
July
1925,
both
in
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/128.
9
'Grogan
Forest
Licence
-
Royalty
Payments
1920-9',
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/127;
'Grogan
Forest
Licence,
1921-8',
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/128;
`Equator
Saw
Mills,
1923-9',
KNAARC(FOR)
7/1/41
II.
10
Grigg
to
Amery
(Secretary
of
State),
12
November
1925,
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/128;
Governor's
Deputy
to
Secretary
of
State,
May
1926;
Conservator
of
Forests
to
Tannahill
(ESM),
25
July
1924;
and
Monthly
Returns,
1924-9,
all
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/1/41
II.
11
'Grogan
Forest
Licence
-
Timber
Payments,
1931-6',
KNA
ARC(FOR)
7/2/129.
12
E.M.
Hyde-Clarke,
`Lembus
Forest:
Appreciation
of
the
Position',
28
July
1938,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
13
'Copy
of
Forest
Lease,
1
March
1916',
KNA
AG
4/2313.
14
'ESM
Ltd
Forest
Concession',
1923,
KNA
AG
4/2332.
15
Governor
Coryndon,
'Definition
of
Native
Rights',
12
December
1923,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
16
E.M.
Hyde-Clarke,
lembus
Forest',
28
July
1938,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
17
H.J.A.
Rae(Forester),
`Lembus
Right-Holders',
29
July
1938,
and
E.M.
Hyde-Clarke,
`Lembus
Forest',
28
July
1938,
both
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
18
Londiani
Forest
Division
Reports,
1931-6,
KNA
ARC(FOR)7/1/1
II,
19
H.J.A.
Rae
(Forester),
`Lembus
Right-Holders',
29
July
1938,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
20
Conservator
of
Forests
to
PC/Rift
Valley,
11
Apri11938,
and
PC/Rift
Valley
to
DC/Baringo,
30
October
1940,
both
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
21
E.M.
Hyde-Clarke,
`Lembus
Forest',
28
July
1938,
and
H.J.A.
Rae,
`Lembus
Right-Holder',
29
July
1938,
both
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
Managing
the
forest:
Lembus,
Kenya
267
22
A.B.
Simpson,
`Lembus
Forest
Area',
19
July
1949,
KNA
NKU/2/1/31;
Denton
(DO/Baringo)
to
Forest
Officer/Londiani,
8
September
1952,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/13/3,
23
A.B.
Simpson
to
Forester/Londiani,
19
May
1948,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
24
A.B.
Simpson
to
Forester/Londiani,
28
August
1948,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/
31.
25
DC/Baringo
to
PC/Rift
Valley,
13
May
1951,
and
DC/Baringo
to
Provincial
Agricultural
Officer/Rift
Valley,
14
August
1951,
both
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/
31.
26
PC/RiftValley
to
Conservator
of
Forests,
22
May
1952,
KNAPC/NKU/2/1/
31.
27
J.M.
ole
Tameno
to
Chief
Native
Commissioner,
12
September
1952,
and
related
correspondence,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
28
DO/Eldama
Ravine
to
DC/Baringo,
26
February
1952,
and
Solicitor
Gen-
eral,
'Memo
on
Lembus',
15
November
1952,
both
KNAPC/NKU/2/1/31.
29
DO/Eldama
Ravine
to
DC/Baringo,
26
February
1952;
R.O.
Hennings
(ALDEV)
to
Colchester
(Member
for
Forestry),
10
March
1956;
PC/Rift
Valley
to
Governor,
28
October
1955,
all
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
Graham
(Acting
Conservator
of
Forests)
to
Chief
Native
Commissioner,
17
Sep-
tember
1952,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/13/3.
30
'Minutes
of
meeting
to
consider
the
Future
of
the
Lembus
Forest',
24
February
1956,
KNA
PC/NKU/2/1/31.
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