The social and economic impacts of peri-urban access to land and secure tenure for the poor: the case of Nairobi, Kenya


Hendriks, B

International Development Planning Review 30(1): 27-66

2008


IDPR,
30
(1)
2008
Bob
Hendriks
The
social
and
economic
impacts
of
peri-
urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor:
the
case
of
Nairobi,
Kenya
The
current
debate
on
urban
land
markets
suggests
that
the
social
and
economic
impacts
of
land
access
are
higher
when
land
tenure
is
formalised
and
integrated
in
the
formal
economy.
Research
in
sub-Saharan
African
cities
suggests
that
informal
systems
can
be
a
gradual
and
more
equal
alternative.
This
paper
analyses
the
process,
social
and
economic
impacts
of
access
to
land
and
tenure
by
poor
households
moving
from
informal
settlements
to
the
peri-urban
areas
of
Nairobi
through
studying
six
recent
cases
of
land-buying
cooperatives,
trusts
and
societies,
including
one
case
in
which
the
poor
actually
relocated.
It
indicates
the
viability
of
a
'third
way'
of
hybrid
land
access
through
formal
collective
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivision
in
sub-Saharan
African
metropolitan
contexts.
It
demonstrates
beneficial
economic
impacts
of
investments
in
housing
improvements
and
renting
rooms
as
alternatives
to
collateralised
lending
and
how
these
can
be
further
increased
through
process
optimisation
and
inclusive
(perilurban
land
governance.
In
the
vast
majority
of
sub-Saharan
African
cities,
the
urban
poor
as
well
as
large
segments
of
low-
and
middle-income
groups
do
not
have
access
to
land
provided
by
the
public
and
formal
private
sector
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005).
The
failure
of
govern-
ment
urban
land
and
housing
policies
and
the
inability
of
the
formal
private
sector
to
provide
land
for
housing
the
poor
have
strengthened
the
attractiveness
of
informal
land
markets
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005;
Rakodi,
2005).
Land
access
through
informal
processes
covers
the
wide
range
of
situations
from
squatting
to
various
forms
of
informal
and
illegal
commercial
land
subdivision.
Payne
(2005)
suggests
that
a
twin-
track
approach
can
improve
existing
slums
and
reduce
the
need
for
future
slums.
In
Nairobi,
the
accelerated
commodification
and
commercialisation
of
unauthor-
ised
housing
since
the
mid-197os
has
transformed
squatting
into
renting
practices
and
small-scale
subsistence
renting
into
large-scale
commercial
housing
(Amis,
1984,
1996).
Natural
internal
population
growth
and
increased
private
development
are
expected
to
further
increase
settlement
densities.
Upgrading
often
leads
to
renting
and
land
sale
by
the
poor.
As
a
consequence,
in
the
near
future
more
of
the
poor
are
expected
to
seek
the
viable
option
of
affordable
land
access
through
informal
land
Bob
Hendriks
is
a
PhD
researcher
in
the
Amsterdam
Institute
for
Metropolitan
and
International
Development
Studies
(AMIDSt),
Nieuwe
Prinsengracht
13o,
ioi8
VZ
Amsterdam,
The
Netherlands;
email:
corn
Paper
submitted
September
2007;
revised
paper
received
and
accepted
April
2008.
28
Bob
Hendriks
delivery
systems
at
the
peripheries
of
the
city'
This
paper
analyses
the
process
(from
land
purchase
to
settlement),
social
impacts
and
economic
impacts
of
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
by
poor
households
moving
from
informal
settlements
to
the
peri-urban
areas
of
Nairobi
through
studying
six
recent
cases
of
collective
land-buying
cooperatives,
trusts
and
societies,
including
one
case
in
which
the
poor
actually
relocated.'
It
discusses
the
ways,
conditions
and
contexts
that
could
make
this
channel
of
access
to
land
a
viable
'third
way'
for
the
poor,
including
the
very
poorest.
First,
the
current
international
debate
on
formal
and
informal
land
delivery
channels
is
discussed,
with
special
attention
paid
to
hybrid
systems
of
collective
formal
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivision.
Second,
the
livelihood
assets
and
vulner-
abilities
of
the
research
communities
are
presented.
Third,
the
process
of
access
to
land
markets
is
discussed
in
terms
of
choice
of
location,
delivery
time
from
the
start
of
savings
until
land
acquisition
and
settlement,
and
the
property
rights
allocated
to
the
(future)
owner
in
regard
to
the
use
of
land
and
the
housing
unit.
Fourth,
the
social
impacts
in
terms
of
improved
perceived
tenure
security,
livelihood
strategies
(building
strategies,
income-generating
strategies
and
access
to
basis
services),
gender
equity
and
residential
mobility
are
discussed.
Fifth,
the
paper
discusses
economic
impacts
in
terms
of
poverty
reduction
(wealth
ranking,
absolute
and
food
poverty
line),
3
Within
Nairobi,
especially
to
the
settlements
of
Embakasi,
Mukuru
(Kiamba,
1
999;
Obala
and
Kinyungu,
2
00
4),
and
in
peH-urban
areas
to
towns
such
as
Mavoko,
Athi
River,
Kitengela
and
Juja.
2
This
was
the
Bellevue
Housing
Cooperative
(BHC).
In
the
case
of
BHC
semi-structured
interviews
focusing
on
the
social
and
economic
impacts
of
land
access
were
held
with
56
original
owners
of
the
relevant
group
of
93
original
owners
who
had
moved
from
the
informal
settlements
of
Nairobi
(14
present
original
owners,
zo
present
original
owners
with
tenants,
four
original
owners
present
on
other
plot,
seven
absentee
original
owners,
and
10
absentee
original
owners
with
tenants;
see also
Fig
6).The
remaining
original
owners
were
very
difficult
to
trace.
The
research
also
included
interviews
with
a
former
original
owners
who
had
sold
their
plots
and
eight
second
owners.
Furthermore,
key
informant
interviews
and
meetings
were
held
with
the
former
chairman,
secretary
and
members
of
the
cooperative
committee,
using
the
cooperative's
logbook,
combined
with
frequent
on-site
observation.
For
all
case
study
communities,
key
informant
interviews
and
focus
group
sessions
with
members
were
held,
as
well
as
visits
to
the
acquired
new
land
and
the
current
residential
location.
Key
informant
interviews
were
also
held
with
personnel
of
the
intermediary
support
organisations.
3
The
very
poorest
are
defined
here
as
those
who
lack
basic
needs
such
as
clothes,
food
and
shelter
for
themselves
and
their
children
(Narayan
and
Nyamwaya,
1996;
Musyoka,
2004).
The
Welfare
Monitoring
Survey
III
(Republic
of
Kenya,
1997)
based
its
categorisation
of
the
poor
and
non-poor
by
wealth
ranking
on
ownership
of
selected
assets
such
as
radio,
sewing
machine,
stove,
fridge,
television,
vehicle,
handcart
and
stereo,
among
others.
If
a
household
owned
two
or
more
of
the
following
assets,
it
was
considered
non-poor:
television,
telephone
(land
line,
not
cellphone),
large
gas/electric
cooker,
vehicle,
urban
house
(Republic
of
Kenya,
1997).
In
Kenya,
the
absolute
poverty
line,
which
indicates
a
household's
inability
to
meet
its
entire
basic
requirement
(food
and
non-food),
is
estimated
at
Ksh
2648
per
month
per
adult
in
urban
areas
and
Ksh
1239
in
rural
areas.
The
food
poverty
line,
i.e.
the
cost
of
consuming
the
recommended
2250
calories
per
day
per
adult,
is
estimated
at
Ksh
1254
in
urban
areas
and
Ksh
927
in
rural
areas
(SID,
2004;
Kimalu
et
al.,
2002;
Nyoro,
2002;
Republic
of
Kenya,
2001).
Internation-
ally
a
monthly
cash
income
of
Ksh
5000
translates
to
less
than
the
often
used
benchmark
of
US
$1
per
person
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
29
investments
in
housing
improvements,
changing
property
values,
costs
of
access
and
increased
access
to
formal
institutional
credit
and
micro-credit.
Sixth,
the
several
ways
by
which
the
enabling
structures
and
contexts
of
these
hybrid
channels
could
increase
social
and
economic
impacts
are
discussed.
Finally,
in
the
conclusion,
the
question
of
the
wider
applicability
and
viability
of
a
possible
'third
way'
of
land
access
through
hybrid
collective
formal
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivision
in Nairobi
and
other
sub-Saharan
African
metropolitan
cities
is
addressed.
The
current
debate: different
channels
of
land
tenure
formalisation
and
their
social
and
economic
impacts
The
current
international
debate
on
urban
land
markets
suggests
that
households
obtain
better
access
when
land
tenure
is
formalised
and
informal
land
markets
are
integrated
in
the
formal
economy.
The
dominant
approach,
propagated
by
international
finan-
cial
agencies
such
as
the
World
Bank
and
Regional
Development
Banks,
focuses
on
de
jure
tenure
formalisation
through
delivery
of
real
individual
property
rights
(freehold,
registered
leasehold)
for
the
promotion
of
(international)
private
sector
development.
Formal
land
titling
programmes
are
proposed
in
line
with
de
Soto's
claim
for
the
role
of
property
ownership
and
collateralised
lending
in
development
(de
Soto,
2000).
A
second
approach
focuses
on
de
jure
tenure
formalisation
through
administrative
recog-
nition
of
occupancy
(personal
rights
by
occupation
licences)
and
de
facto
recognition
of
occupancy
(making
increased
informal
land
access
secure
and
reducing
poverty).
This
approach
is
currently
promoted
by
UN-Habitat
and
UNDP.
Their
main
aim
is
social
and
economic
integration
of
slums
and
informal
settlements.
The
current
debate
increasingly
revolves
around
the
question
of
empirical
evidence
for
the
benefits
and
pitfalls
of
land
formalisation
(Benjaminsen,
2006;
Payne
et
al.,
2007).
Thereby
the
question
is
raised
whether
titling
programmes
are
the
most
effec-
tive
and
appropriate
means
of
realising
the
social
and
economic
objectives
claimed
or
whether
these
could
also
be
realised
by
improving
the
way
existing
systems
of
tenure
operate
or
adopting
more
gradual
shifts
from
existing
informal
regimes
to
more
formal
systems
(Benjaminsen,
2006;
Payne
et
al.,
2007).
Benjaminsen
(2006)
stresses
the
importance
of
examining
whether
there
is
a
demand
for
formalisation,
whose
demand
it
is
and
for
what
kind
of
formalisation.
Formalisation
programmes
challenging
local
culture
(cultural
practices,
legal
traditions
and
economic
circum-
stances)
seem
unlikely
to
succeed
(Benjaminsen,
2006).
Recently
also
a
World
Bank
per
day.
In
other
words,
an
average
household
(of
four
persons)
in
Nairobi
with
an
income
of
less
than
Ksh
5000
per
month
is
not
only
unable
to
meet
its
basic
needs,
but
can
barely
put
food
on
the
table
on
a
daily
basis
(Owuor,
2006).
Based
on
the
above,
households
are
defined
here
as
very
poorest
when
they
earn
less
than
Ksh
2648
per
month
and
as
poor
when
they
earn
between
Ksh
2648
and
Ksh
5000
per
adult
per
month,
while
not
owning
two
or
more
of
the
above
mentioned
assets.
30
Bob
Hendriks
publication
indicated
that
with
undeveloped
capital
markets
in
most
developing
countries
and
a
spectrum
of
ownership
structures,
titling
can
be
a
necessary
condition
to
develop
a
fully
functional
housing
market,
but
will
not
'unlock'
capital
now
locked
up
in
dead
assets
as
claimed
by
de
Soto.
It
also
may
not
necessarily
result
in
increasing
the
assets
of
the
poor
(Buckley
and
Kalarickal,
2006).
Recent
research
on
the
strengths
and
weaknesses
of
alternative
land
delivery
mechanisms
in
sub-Saharan
African
cities,
especially
in
regard
to
the
poor,
and
on
the
social
institutions
and
state—society
relationships
that
underpin
and
regulate
trans-
actions
and
disputes
over
land,
stresses
the
importance
of
government
policies
and
regulations
that
support
and
facilitate
informal
mechanisms
of
land
access
(Durand-
Lasserve,
2005;
Durand-Lasserve
and
Selod,
2007;
Rakodi,
2005,
2006a).
The
research
recognises
that
the
(reinterpreted)
roots
of
these
contemporary
processes
and
mechanisms
of
urban
land
delivery
lay
in
customary
tenure
systems
in
rural
areas.
At
the
same
time
it
points
out
the
reinforced
modifications
of
social
rules,
especially
in
urban
areas,
by
colonial
and
post-colonial
urban
policies
and
legislative
reforms,
rapid
population
growth,
growing
inequality
and
ethnic
mixing
(Kombe,
2005;
Kombe
and
Kreibich,
2002;
Rakodi,
2006b;
Rakodi
and
Leduka,
2004;).
Furthermore,
in
line
with
social
agency
theory,
it
stresses
that
the
conceptual
framework
of
the
formal/informal
dichotomy
does
not
adequately
capture
contemporary
land
delivery
processes
and
that
state
and
other
social
actors
always
mutually
constitute
the
institutions
under-
pinning
land
delivery
processes
by
accommodation
through
compliance
and
conflict
through
non-compliance
(Rakodi,
2006b).
Current
research
questions
the
effectiveness
of
informal
land
delivery
mecha-
nisms
in
reaching
the
poorest
segments
of
the
urban
population,
as
well
as
their
long-
term
sustainability
and
accessibility,
especially
in
the
absence
of
appropriate
public
policies,
such
as
adapted
planning
norms
and
standards
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005).
Recent
studies
indicate
that,
in
regard
to
the
land
delivery
system
of
purchase
through
markets,
mostly
middle
and
middle-low
income
groups
rather
than
the
poor
and
very
poorest
have
access
to
land
through
the
channel
of
(commercial)
land-buying
companies
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005;
Gatabaki-Kamau,
2000;
Rakodi,
2005;
Musyoka,
2004).
This
does
however
not
mean
that
hybrid
land
delivery
systems
of
formal
land
purchase
and
informal
subdivision
of
land
are
of
no
use
to
the
poorest
in
urban
areas
and
the
metropolitan
context.
The
present
discussion
needs
to
further
integrate
the
question
of
effective
land
access
by
the
poor
and
very
poorest
through
these
hybrid
systems
in
the
metropolitan
context.
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
31
Hybrid
systems
of
collective
formal
land
purchase
through
the
market
and
informal
land
subdivision
Kenya
is
characterised
by
a
private
market
orientation
towards
land
delivery
(Rakodi,
20o6b).
There
is
no
significant
customary
land
management
as
customary
land
is
held
in
trust
by
the
government
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005).
A
recent
study
argues
that
Kenya
has
been
familiar
with
the
concept
of
individual
freehold
titling
from
the
time
before
independence
and
emphasises
the
conflicting
political
economic
character
of
the
development
of
Kenya's
land
delivery
systems
(Musyoka,
2006,
2004).
Musyoka
summarises
the
political
economic
development
of
land
tenure
systems
in
Kenya,
starting
with
the
pre-colonial
days
characterised
by
family-based
communal
use
rights
to
resources
for
pastoralist
groups
and
communal
or
clan
use
rights
akin
to
private
ownership
for
cultivators
(see
also
Muriuki,
1976;
Rutten,
1992;
Sutton,
1976).
She
then
describes
the
time
of
European
settlement
from
1891,
with
the
introduction
of
direct
rule
and
the
evolution
of
a
dual
system
of
land
tenure
and
administration
based
on
formal
state
rules
governing
the
ownership
and
delivery
of
land
(see
also
Kanyinga,
200o).
Finally,
she
discusses
the
time
of
settlement
schemes
towards
the
end
of
colonisation
and
the
commencing
of
independence
when
registered
freehold
titling
was
introduced
in
African
farming
(Musyoka,
2006).
The
related
political
economic
developments
and
conflicts
over
land,
which
eventually
also
led
to
the
emergence
of
hybrid
systems
of
collective
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivi-
sion,
started
with
the
annexation
of
land
for
European
settlement
through
imported
laws
by
the
colonial
administration
introducing
a
parallel
individualised
tenure
system
based
on
freehold
or
leasehold
title.
This
goes
together
with
the
expropriation
of
indigenous
occupants
and
their
relegation
to
reserves
with
boundaries
drawn
along
ethnic
lines
in
areas
considered
unsuitable
for
European
settlement,
only
allowing
for
customary
tenure
arrangements
increasingly
based
on
individual
families
rather
than
clan
or
kinship,
enforced
by
chiefs
appointed
by
the
colonial
administration
(Bruce
and
Migot-Adholla,
1994).
In
an
attempt
to
resolve
the
overcrowding
and
increased
pressure
on
land
in
'native'
reserves
and
to
defuse
the
demand
for
redistribution
of
European-held
land,
individualisation
of
tenure
and
consolidation
of
fragmented
holdings
were
introduced
in
the
reserves,
allowing
increased
agricultural
production
that
would
bring
sufficient
returns
on
the
small
plots
and
the
emergence
of
a
land
market.
Under
the
state
of
emergency
between
1952
and
1960,
increasingly
unequal
land
redistribution
was
anticipated
by
the
colonial
authorities
through
the
conver-
sion
of
customary
tenure
rights
into
registered
individual
freehold
of
land
through
titling.
This
resulted
in
acquisition
of
land
by
the
chiefs
and
those
loyal
to
the
colonial
government
and
the
wealthy,
while
excluding
others
from
rights
to
their
land,
particu-
larly
those
who
could
not
participate
in
the
adjudication
process
because
of
poverty
or
because
they
were
in
detention,
and
women,
since
land
titles
(and
the
right
to
dispose
of
land)
were
conferred
on
male
heads
of
household
only
(Kanyinga,
200o;
32
Bob
Hendriks
Knox,
1998).
To
protect
the
'white
highlands'
from
encroachment
by
those
rendered
landless
by
the
reforms
in
the
reserves,
settlement
schemes,
entailing
the
settlement
of
households
on
land
that
might,
prior
to
colonialism,
have
been
considered
the
territory
of
a
different
ethnic
group,
were
introduced
by
the
colonial
government
in
1961.
After
independence
in
1963,
the
first
post-colonial
government
continued
to
establish
such
schemes
(Musyoka,
2006).
In
practice
about
40
per
cent
of
the
former
area
of
European
mixed
farms
was
subdivided
for
resettlement
to
less
than
5
per
cent
of
the
landless
population,
especially
to
ethnic
groups
that
had
been
hardest
hit
by
the
original
expropriation
of
agricultural
land
and
lived
in
the
most
overcrowded
reserves,
particularly
Kikuyu
(Ogot,
1995;
Republic
of
Kenya,
1999).
Hybrid
systems
of
collective
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivision
origi-
nate
from
land
distribution
in
the
resettlement
period
just
after
independence,
when
President
Kenyatta
stressed
that
Kenyans
could
not
expect
to
get
land
for
free
and
the
purchase
of
land
from
departing
settler
farmers
was
encouraged
(Etherton,
1972;
Gatabaki-Kamau,
2000;
Gitau,
2002;
Musyoka,
2004,
2006;
Yahya,
2002).
These
land-buying
groups'
formed
by
shareholders
with
varying
income
levels
are
believed
to
be
a
uniquely
Kenyan
phenomenon
(Rakodi,
2006b).
The
hybrid
systems
can
be
subdivided
into
land-buying
companies,
land-buying
cooperatives
and
land-buying
trusts,
societies,
and
associations
(Obala
and
Kinyungu,
2004).
Land-buying
companies
and
cooperatives
are
entities,
registered
under
the
Companies
Act
or
the
Cooperatives
Act
respectively,
that
buy
(large)
pieces
of
land
for
subdivision
to
members.
They
are
a
mode
of
gaining
access
to
land,
not
a
form
of
communal
or
cooperative
ownership
(Yahya,
2002).
They
are
formed
by
individ-
uals
coming
together
to
pool
their
resources
for
purposes
of
buying
land,
which
is
subdivided
later.
Each
member
contributes
shares
to
the
total
capital
of
the
group
according
to
financial
ability
and,
upon
purchase
of
the
land,
it
is
subdivided
and
allocated
proportionally
depending
on
the
number
of
shares
a
shareholder
owns.
This
flexibility
allows
people
with
relatively
low
incomes
to
become
a
member
of
such
a
group
(Musyoka,
2004).
Commercial
land-buying
companies
are
interested
in
subdi-
viding
and
selling
the
land
for
purely
commercial
purposes
rather
than
in
occupying
the
land
themselves
for
immediate
use
(Musyoka,
2004).
Land-buying
trusts,
societies
or
associations
are
entities
registered
under
the
Trustees,
Societies
or
Registered
Land
Act,
and
also
formed
by
individuals
coming
together,
often
with
or
through
the
support
of
finance
initiatives
for
low-income
housing,
to
pool
their
savings
for
purposes
of
buying
land
and
most
of
the
time
also
housing.
Land
remains
in
the
hands
of
the
trust
for
a
longer
time,
mostly
until
repay-
ment
of
the
mortgage
for
land
and
housing
through
rent,
the
land
and/or
house
ownership
can
be
transferred
to
the
individual.
The
advantages
of
informal
systems,
currently
responding
to
new
demands
in
free-market-oriented
Kenya,
are
said
to
lie
in
their
being
less
bureaucratic
and
more
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
33
Secure
collective
de
jure
tenure
Relatively
secure
individual
de
facto
recognition
occupancy,
but
possible threat
Secure
individual
de
jure
tenure
Collective
legal
title
Formal
transaction
No
individual
legal
title:
share
certificate
Informal
subdivision
and
transactions
Individual
formal
titles
Formalisation
subdivisions
Figure
1
Collective
and
individual
de
facto
and
de
jure
tenure
security
(adapted,
based
on
Musyoka,
2004; 2006;
and
Durand-Lasserve,
2007)
flexible,
involving
short
delivery
times,
lower
transaction
costs,
and
the
provision
of
enough
tenure
security
to
encourage
investment
in
housing
(Durand-Lasserve,
2005).
Figure
i
illustrates
the
sequence
of
land
acquisition
for
households
of
land-
buying
companies,
cooperatives
and
trusts.
First,
secure
collective
tenure
is
acquired
in
a
formal
land
transaction.
Second,
relatively
secure
individual
tenure
is
acquired
through
informal
plot
subdivision
and
the
issuing
of
de
facto
share
certificates.
Finally,
share
certificates
may
be
converted
into
formal
individual
titles,
in
principle
upon
completion
of
the
loan.
Livelihoods
and
the
social
and
economic
impacts
of
access
to
land
The
concept
of
livelihood
offers
the
possibility
of
analysing
the
impacts
of
land
access
not
only in
sectoral
terms
of
the
need
for
land
and
shelter,
but
from
the
integrated
perspective
of
poor
households
managing
their
asset
portfolios
in
various
ways
to
reduce
vulnerability
and
enhance
well-being.
A
livelihood
can
be
defined
as
comprising
`the
capabilities,
assets
(including
both
material
and
social
resources)
and
activities
required
for
a
means
of
living'
(Carney,
igg8).
The
core
of
the
urban
livelihoods
approach
is
the
concept
of
increasing
security,
in
which
security
is
defined
as
the
ability
to
recover
from
shocks
and
stresses
and
to
maintain
and
enhance
capabilities
and
assets
(Carney,
1998;
Rakodi,
2002;
Scoones,
igg8).
Increased
security
is
the
result
of
the
variety
of
assets
that
low-income
households
can
access,
the
trade-offs
between
these
assets,
vulnerability
to
loss
of
assets,
and
resilience
in
coping
with
such
loss.
Recent
research
has
stressed
that
in
addition
to
its
strong
actor
orientation,
the
liveli-
hoods
approach
should
incorporate
the
roles
of
enabling
structures
(De
Haan
and
Zoomers,
2003;
Kaag
et
al.,
2004)
and
enabling
institutional,
political
and
economic
contexts
(Devas,
2002).
Literature
relating
to
the
social
impact
of
gender
equity
realises
that
both
statu-
tory
and
customary
tenure
regimes
discriminate
strongly
against
women,
especially
through
the
non-recognition
of
inheritance
rights.
Although
progress
is
reported
in
terms
of
rights
for
women,
in
practice
serious
legal,
procedural
and
cultural
barriers
still
have
to
be
overcome
in
generations
to
come
(Payne,
Durand-Lasserve
and
Rakodi,
2007).
Moser
(igg8)
recognised
the
importance
of
habitat
as
a
major
asset
for
poor
house-
holds
through
renting
or
running
home-based
economic
enterprises.
Recent
literature
34
Bob
Hendriks
on
the
economic
impacts
of
land
stresses
the
importance
of
formalisation
or
sufficient
tenure
security
for
investment
in
housing
improvements,
whereby
titling
is
not
the
only
way
to
get
results
and
indeed
can
often
be
counterproductive
because
of
the
costs
and
time
involved
(Payne,
Durand-Lasserve
and
Rakodi,
2007).
Another
discussed
economic
impact
is
the
claim,
broadly
supported
in
the
literature,
that
titling
increases
property
values
by
25
per
cent
on
average.
The
other
side
of
the
coin
shows
that
this
is
less
attractive
for
buyers,
could
lead
to
future
exclusion
of
the
urban
poor
and
to
an
increase
of
due
speculation,
drawing
existing
capital
away
from
more
produc-
tive
ventures
and
contributing
to
intergenerational
transfer
of
resources
from
future
to
present
generations
(Payne,
Durand-Lasserve
and
Rakodi,
2007;
Mitchel,
2006).
With
regard
to
the
economic
impact
of
access
to
(mortgage)
credit
through
titling,
considerations
are
raised
concerning
the
form
and
duration
of
title
and
the
preclusion
of
owners
unable
to
meet
all
the
official
standards
from
accessing
institutional
credit
(Payne,
Durand-Lasserve
and
Rakodi,
2007).
Case
studies
and
context
Nairobi
is
an
interesting
case
because
there
have
been
quite
a
number
of
recent
collective
(hybrid)
land
access
initiatives
by
the
poor
themselves
in
the
context
of
land
markets
with
high
commodification,
rapidly
rising
property
values,
high
tenure
insecurity,
extreme
politicisation
of
land
access,
very
high
densities
and
poor
environ-
mental
conditions.
A
twin-track
approach
is
spontaneously
evolving.
Selection
of
case
studies
was
primarily
made
on
the
basis
of
four
main
types
of
(hybrid)
collective
land
access
in
the
peri-urban
areas
used
by
poor
residents
from
informal
settlements
of
Nairobi:
self-financed
land,
housing
and
infrastructure,
with
or
without
loans
on
the
commercial
market;
self-financed
land
through
savings
(in
combination
with
loans
from
the
affordable
housing
finance
sector),
housing
and
infrastructure
financed
through
loans
from
the
affordable
housing
finance
sector
or
infrastructure
through
renting
or
land
sale
to
middle-income
households;
self-financed
land
through
savings
(in
combination
with
loans
from
the
affordable
housing
finance
sector),
housing
through
incremental
building,
infrastructure
self-
financed
or
through
micro-finance
for
low-income
households;
and
self-financed
land
through
savings
(in
combination
with
loans
from
the
afford-
able
housing
finance
sector),
housing
through
loans
from
the
affordable
housing
finance
sector,
infrastructure
through
grants.
Other
selection
criteria
were
differentiation
in
size
(small/medium/large)
and
reason
for
moving
(eviction/upgrading/other).
,
INOenya
Kimbu
-
AKikuyu
L
beSe
liKanflemi
KilDera
rMitumba
slgong
iseria'n
N
5
kilometers
Nairoe
5
rea
NT
Isinya
Huruma
Matharel
Sovetoi
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
35
.bika
iru
WAB
SBNM
HC
*Athi
River
*
populated
places
informal
settlements
initiatives/case
studies
administrative
boundaries
Pff
Nairobi
city
centre
rivers
resettlement
poor
households
roads
Figure
2
Locations
of
the
six
case
studies
in
peri-urban
Nairobi
36
Bob
Hendriks
Table
1
Main
characteristics
of
case
study
organisations
(BHC,
KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB)
BHC
OWAB
GSS
TMSS
KNT
SBNM
Strategy
Self-financed
Granted
land,
Self-financed
Self-financed
Self-financed
Self
financed
applied
land,
collective
land,
land;,
land;
incremental
self-financed
incremental
Low-cost
mortgage
building
construction
building, building,
housing;
or
through
infrastructure
infrastructure
infrastructure
loan
grant
grant
through
houses
for
rich
Type
of
Cooperative
Cooperative
Trust Trust
Trust
(low-cost
Trust
(low-cost
neo-customary
(CBO
until
housing
housing
system
2001)
scheme
of
scheme
finance
for
of
poor
low-income
themselves)
initiative)
Location
Mlolongo/
Muigain
Donyo Donyo
Kisalu
Mitaboni/
Municipaliiy
Shokimau
Jula
Sabuk/
Sabuk/
Kaputei
Katani
District
Mavoko
Thika
Komarock
Komarock
Kaliado
Mavoko
Machakos
Mavoko
Mavoko
Machakos
Machakos
Machakos
Distance
from
25
km
30
km
60
km
55
km
65
km
40
km
Nairobi
centre
Former
Mitumba
Mathare
Ghetto-
Kibera
Mathare/
Mathare/
residence
Huruma
Kibera/
Huruma,
Soweto
Korogocho/
Kibera/
Kangemi/
Mukuru/
Maili
Saba
Number
of
139
house-
48
house-
150
active
550
10,000 10,000
members
holds holds
members
borrowers
people
active
352
total
members
members
(paid
fee)
Number
of
5
10
40
80
293
600
acres
acres
(poor)
200
acres
(middle
class)
Size
plots
in
97.5
sq
m
93
sq
m
(6.1
39
sq
m
156
sq
m
50
sq
m
94
sq
m
acres
(6.5
by
15
by
15.
24
m)
(13
by12
m)
(6.71
by
m(
14.02
m)
Number
of
140
(139
51
(48
152
(150
527
(plan
2,000
500
+
plots
residential,
residential,
residential,
1)
(504
residential
1
collective)
3
collective)
2
collective)
residential,23
collective
&
commercial)
378
(plan
2)
Core
identiiy
Shared
Gender:
Shared
Profession:
Still
to
be
Shared
ethnicity:
female
ethnicity:
traders
decided
ethnicity:
Kikuyu
Mixed
ethnic
Kikuyu
Kamba
background
(97%).
Few
Luo,
Luhya,
Kamba
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
37
Figure
2
shows
the
locations
of
the
six
case
studies
in
the
peri-urban
areas
of
Nairobi.
Arrows
connect
the
location
of
the
informal
settlement(s)
from
which
the
poor
residents
moved
with
the
newly
acquired
location.
Distances
from
Nairobi
city
centre
are
indicated
in
Table
1.
In
Nairobi
no
cases
exist
of
the
first
strategy
involving
a
considerable
number
of
poor
people.
Individual
land
access
through
(commercial)
land-buying
companies
is
not
affordable
for
the
poor
and
very
poorest.
4
Two
cases
of
the
second
strategy
exist
in
Nairobi:
Kaputiei
New
Town
(KNT)
and
Shangilia
Baba
Na
Mama
(SBNM).
5
SBNM
eventually
changed
its
strategy
for
infrastructure
to
renting/selling
to
middle-income
households,
as
support
from
finance
organisations
for
housing
and
infrastructure
was
(partly)
unavailable.
Two
cases
of
the
third
strategy
exist:
Bellevue
Housing
Coopera-
tive
(BHC)
and
Original
Wapenda
Afya
Bidii
Women's
Group
(OWAB).
Finally,
two
cases
of
the
fourth
strategy
exist
in
Nairobi:
Toi
Market
Savings
Scheme
(TMSS)
and
Ghetto
Savings
Scheme
(GSS).
6
Table
i
presents
the
main
characteristics
of
the
case
studies
in
order
of
size
of
land,
ranging
from
small
(BHC,
OWAB)
to
medium
(GSS,
TMSS)
and
large
(KNT,
SBNM).
The
size
of
individual
plots
ranges
from
39
sq
m
(GSS)
to
156
sq
m
(TMSS),
depending
on
the
number
of
subdivided
plots
on
the
land.
The
core
identity
of
the
initiatives
is
ethnic
background,
gender
and
profession.
Livelihood
assets
and
vulnerabilities
of
the
case
study
communities
In
this
section
the
livelihood
assets
of
the
case
study
communities
before
moving
from
the
informal
settlements
are
analysed.
In
Nairobi
55
per
cent
of
the
2.4
million
residents
live
in
informal
settlements
which
cover
only
5.5
per
cent
of
the
city's
residential
land
(Matrix,
1993).
Much
of
the
land
they
occupy
is
public
property
and
the
remainder
is
privately
owned.
Neighbourhoods
within
these
high-density
informal
settlements
are
often
inhabited
by
residents
with
a
similar
ethnic
background.
4
Commercial
land-buying
companies
are
often
used
by
the
non-poor
in
Nairobi,
for
example
the
Embakasi
Ranching
Company
(Yahya,
2002),
Harambee
Sacco
in
Greenfields
(Taylor,
2004),
and
the
Githurai
Land
Buying
Company
(Gatabaki-Kamau,
1989).
There
are
also
many
LBCs
formed
through
trade
unions
and
teachers'
associations.
5
The
case
of
Rahema
Housing
Cooperative
from
Ruai
slums
with
25
members
was
not
selected,
because
of
the
involvement
in
a
pilot
project
on
dome
construction
for
an
information
centre/businesses
and
the
availability
of
two
other
small-sized
examples.
6
Pamoj
a
Trust
also
supports
12
saving
groups
of
the
poor
in
the
Mavoko
area,
but
their
members
do
not
originate
from
Nairobi's
informal
settlements
and
have
been
relocated
to
make
way
for
a
planned
industrial
area.
38
Bob
Hendriks
Social
assets
The
residents
of
the
case
study
communities
organised
themselves
in
land-buying
cooperatives
and
trusts
by
ethnic
background
(BHC/Kikuyu,
GSS/Kikuyu,
SBNM/
Kamba),
gender
(OWAB/women)
and
profession
(TMSS/traders).
Sometimes
ethnic
background
as
bonding
principle
is
related
to
the
location
of
the
settlement
or
village
involved
(KNT/Mathare,
Kibera,
Soweto).
Each
land-buying
cooperative
or
trust,
except
for
SBNM,
has
relations
with
a
local
organisation
providing
housing
finance
support
for
low-income
households
(Pamoja
Trust,
NACHU,
Jamii
Bora).
Most
residents
are
also
members
of
other
civil
society
networks
to
strengthen
their
resilience.
In
BHC
there
are
quite
a
number
of
multi-local
households,
such
as
those
with
male
heads
whose
wives
live
in
the
rural
areas,
often
accompanied
by
children
of
primary
school
age.
Physical
assets
Five
of
the
case
study
communities
had
very
low
tenure
security
and
their
cases
are
the
direct
result
of
high
vulnerability
to
evictions
and
demolition.
BHC
and
SBNM
originate
from
repeated
demolition
and
evictions
of
their
homes,
GSS
and
TMSS
from
the
creation
of
a
strengthened
negotiation
basis
through
alternative
land
in
anticipation
of
the
possible
threat
of
eviction
related
to
disputes
on
land
and
upgrading.
KNT
emerged
from
the
more
general
threat
to
secure
tenure,
the
reloca-
tion
of
citizens
between
Mathare
villages
in
2002
and
the
inability
of
the
poor
to
save
because
landlords
always
first
raise
the
rents.
OWAB
originated
from
an
internal
dispute
within
Wapenda
Afya.
As
a
consequence
of
the
threat
of
eviction
and
lack
of
land
ownership
in
the
informal
settlements,
there
is
little
space
for
housing
development
and
the
use
of
housing
for
productive
purposes
in
home-based
enterprises.
In
all
cases,
residents
face
very
poor
shelter quality
(see
Figs.
3
and
4)
(12
by
io
feet
wattle
and
mud
shacks
in
Ghetto;
mobile
tents
and
semi-permanent
structures
of
polythene,
paper,
timber
and
corrugated
iron
sheets
in
Mitumba;
mud,
wood
and
corrugated
iron
sheet
struc-
tures,
sometimes
combined
with
concrete
floors,
in
Mathare;
water
and
overflowing
sewers
running
downhill
through
houses
in
the
rainy
season)
and
living
conditions
(high
density,
fire,
insecurity,
forced
protection
fees,
crime,
violence,
illegal
brewing
).
In
general,
access
to
basic
services
for
the
households
involved
is
very
low
in
all
related
informal
settlements.
Toilet
facilities
are
lacking
and
the
use
of
'flying
toilets',
7
open
fields,
improvised
polythene
and
cardboard
latrines,
overcrowded
toilet
blocks
7
The
term
'flying
toilet'
refers
to
the
use
of
a
tin
or
plastic
bag
for
defecation,
which
is
then
thrown
out
of
the
window,
into
ditches
and
rivers,
along
the
roadside
or
simply
as
far
away
as
possible.
For
video
description,
see
http:
//www.tearsofafrica.org/media/video/flyingtoilets.
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
39
ft
(61
a
4,
4
14
Figure
3
Shelter
quality:
OWAB
in
Mathare,
mud
and
wattle
structure
with
cardboard
on
wall
with
cupboard
and
sofa as
main
assets
and
overflowing
sewers
is
common.
Water
is
accessed
from
contaminated
water
sources,
water
taps
costing
a
relatively
high
price
per
gallon
and
through
illegal
water
tapping
from
city
council
lines.
Access
to
electricity
is
almost
non-existent.
Lighting
is
through
candles
and
tin
kerosene
lamps
and
some
households
use
illegal
electricity
tapping
with
a
high
risk
of
fire
through
short-circuiting.
Garbage
collection
services
are
almost
absent,
with
garbage
lying
around
and
residents
sometimes
organising
irregular
clean-ups.
Access
to
education
is
often
through
informal
primary
schools
in
the
slums
or
through
a
limited
number
of
often
overcrowded
public
schools
in
the
surrounding
areas.
Access
to
first-line
health
services
and
clinics
is
often
avail-
able
at
an
affordable
price
through
NGOs
and
church-based
organisations.
Access
to
second-line
health
services
at
Nairobi
and
Kenyatta
Hospital
is
limited,
although
these
lie
within
a
distance
of
io
to
15
kilometres,
as
almost
no
poor
households
have
health
insurance.
40
Bob
Hendriks
4
w
Figure
4
Shelter
quality:
GSS
in
Ghetto-Huruma,
old
iron
sheets,
polythene,
wooden
walls,
mud
floor
Financial
assets
The
majority
of
the
residents
of
informal
settlements
have
no
jobs,
or
low-paid
informal
jobs
that
change
frequently.
It
is
difficult
to
state
their
income
reliably.
Household
income
is
mainly
spent
on
basic
needs
and
saving
money
is
very
difficult.
Furthermore,
to
open
a
formal
bank
account
starting
capital
has
to
be
deposited.
Nonetheless,
most
residents
have
still
managed
to
build
up
savings
of
Ksh
3o
to
40
per
day
over
about
four
years
to
acquire
access
to
land.
The
cases
of
GSS
and
TMSS,
saving
groups
of
Muungano
wa
Wanavijiji,
indicate
that
with
the
clear
goal
of
land
access
in
mind
households
manage
their
savings
better
than
with
the
general
aim
of
social
security.
In
order
to
qualify
for
a
housing
loan
at
Jamii
Bora,
the
poor
need
to
first
successfully
complete
three
business
loans.
An
alternative
to
savings
is
having
access
to
credit,
but
the
level
of
access
to
credit
is
low.
The
amounts
offered
are
large
and
interest
rates
often
too
high
for
the
poor.
Many
poor
try
to
get
access
to
short-term
loans
and
small
amounts
of
credit
through
neighbours
and
shopkeepers.
Some
micro-finance
institutions
offer
credit
services
with
F.
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
41
more
favourable
conditions
to
the
poor.
To
overcome
the
threat
of
trading
offphysical
assets
and
human
assets
of
education
and
health,
which
some
BHC
households
faced
when
selling
their
plots,
Jamii
Bora
chose
an
integrated
approach
and
offered
its
members
free
life
insurance
and
the
option
of
health
insurance
for
a
payment
of
Ksh
3o
per
week
or
Ksh
1200
per
year.
Human
assets
The
education
level
of
residents
of
the
case
study
communities
often
makes
them
dependent
upon
the
informal
sector
and
neighbourhood-related
social
networks
for
access
to
work.
In
general
about
75
per
cent
of
the
household
members
in
informal
settlements
of
Nairobi
have
educational
qualifications
ranging
from
never
having
attended
school
to
having
some
secondary
education,
with
men
slightly
better
off
than
women
(UN-Habitat/Mavoko
Municipal
Council,
2005).
In
BHC
64
per
cent
of
residents
have
low
levels
of
education
up
to
some
secondary
education,
while
27
per
cent
of
the
original
members
acquired
technical
skills
through
vocational
training.
Others
increase
their
assets
through
learning
by
doing
and
on
the
job.
In
general
about
75
to
85
per
cent
of
the
residents
of
the
informal
settlements
of
Nairobi
work
on
and
off
in
the
informal
sector
(UN-Habitat/Republic
of
Kenya,
2004;
Hendriks,
forthcoming).
In
BHC
64
per
cent
of
the
members
worked
in
the
informal
sector
when
still
living
in
Mitumba,
24
per
cent
of
them
as
self-employed,
while
respectively
g
per
cent
and
18
per
cent
worked
in
the
public
and
private
sectors.
Members
of
OWAB
are
almost
all
self-employed
(as
tailors,
salespersons,
etc.).
The
majority
within
GSS
work
in
the
informal
sector
at
casual
jobs
(hawkers)
and
as
sales-
persons.
Members
of
TMSS
are
self-employed
private
market
stall
owners
and
renters
selling
fruit,
vegetables
or
clothes,
facing
risks
of
selling
out
of
plots
and
in
the
process
of
negotiations
on
ownership
around
upgrading.
The
members
of
KNT
all
operate
small-scale
businesses.
With
their
skills,
knowledge
and
experience
in
mind
most
poor
households
are
often
afraid
and
reluctant
to
relocate
from
a
central
location
to
the
peri-urban
areas.
The
(threat
of)
repeated
evictions
and
demolitions,
resulting
in
very
low
tenure
security,
often
has
to
be
very
high
before
the
poor
are
ready
to
move.
This
is
also
illustrated
by
the
case
of
the
women
of
OWAB,
who
have
had
access
to
peri-urban
land
since
2002,
but
still
have
not
moved,
partly
because
of
the
building
costs
involved,
but
mainly
because
of
the
lack
of
skills
and
physical
conditions
for
farming,
fear
of
loss
of
their
informal
jobs,
and
transport
costs
to
Nairobi
city.
The
starting
phase
of
the
case
of
BHC
illustrates
the
vulnerability
the
poor
face
when
changing
settlement
at
a
time
of
a
lack
of
economic
development
in
the
settlement
area
and
absence
of
access
to
casual
informal
jobs,
markets
and
social
networks.
As
factories
sprang
up
in
the
area,
some
residents
started
to
sell
products
to
factory
workers
(providing
cakes
and
food
at
42
Bob
Hendriks
lunchtime)
and
some
started
working
in
the
factories.
In
the
cases
of
TMSS
and
GSS,
residents
stated
that
they
were
willing
to
go
through
a
transitional
phase
in
which
they
reduce
their
vulnerability
through
working
and
living
in
both
their
present
and
future
locations.
It
is
hard
to
acquire
new
skills.
In
the
case
of
KNT
people
are
able
to
work
through
construction
work
on
the
site.
Access
to
land
markets
Choice
of
location
The
main
criteria
used
for
selecting
the
location
of
land
are
availability
and
price.
Although
considerable
time
and
effort
are
spent
on
land
selection,
mostly
it
is
not
based
on
a
set
of
integrated
livelihoods
criteria.
As
a
consequence
the
acquired
land
may
be
isolated
or
unsuited
for
productive
use,
may
require
relatively
high
transport
costs,
and
may
lack
a
prospective
local
market.
BHC
selected
an
isolated,
rocky
plot,
unsuited
for
agriculture,
lacking
a
local
market,
partly
encroached
upon
by
a
neigh-
bour
and
not
too
far
from
the
highway.
The
plot
was
available
at
the
time
through
the
National
Cooperative
Housing
Union,
because
another
cooperative
was
unable
to
fulfil
loan
repayment
for
the
land.
The
transformation
of
the
surroundings
into
a
major
industrial
and
economically
thriving
area
since
the
end
of
the
iggos
happened
by
coincidence
to
BHC
and
was
not
anticipated
in
the
selection
and
planning
process.
For
OWAB
the
stable
value
of
the
fertile
land
as
a
capital
base,
rather
than
as
a
produc-
tive
asset,
played
a
major
role.
TMSS
made
a
more
precise
selection
and
preferred
a
location
next
to
the
main
road.
Delivery
time
Delivery
time
is
divided
into
time
until
land
acquisition
and
total
time
until
settle-
ment.
Delivery
time
for
land
acquisition
ranges
from
two
to
five
years
and
on
average
takes
up
to
three
years
(see
Table
2).
The
period
of
land
acquisition
for
GSS
and
TMSS
seems
relatively
long,
but
this
is
mainly
because
people
started
saving
for
general
security
purposes,
before
changing
to
land
tenure
purposes.
Delivery
time
for
BHC
and
SBNM
is
partly
influenced
by
the
sense
of
urgency
and
the
need
for
quick
arrangements
related
to
demolition
and
eviction.
OWAB
and
KNT
had
relatively
quick
access
to
land
within
two
years,
but
it
took
a
long
period
of
time
to
fulfil
regula-
tions.
OWAB
members
claim
that
the
authorities
deliberately
lost
their
title
deed
and
they
had
to
go
through
procedures
twice.
For
KNT
approval
of
design
and
planning
through
detailed
plans
took
long.
Total
delivery
time
until
settlement
ranges
from
three
years
to
seven
or
eight
years
and
in
one
case
up
to
12
years
(see
also
Fig.
5).
BHC
is
the
only
initiative
for
which
the
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
43
Table
2
Delivery
time
up
to
land
acquisition
and
up
to
settlement
(BHC,
KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB)
BHC
OWAB
SBNM
KNT
GSS
TMSS
Start
savings
1994
1999
1996
2000
2001 2001
Membership
Land
donated
Membership
Micro-
General
General
savings
savings
business
loans
savings savings
+
savings
Identification
1994
1999
1997
2002
2005 2005
Purchase
1996
2002
1997
2002
May
2006
Oct
2005
(253
acres)
(40
acres)
2004
Dec
2005
(40
acres)
(40
acres)
Delivery
time
up
2.5
years
to
land
acquisition
3
years
2
years
4
years
5
years
4
years
Building
1997
2002
2001
2002
2006
Incremental
Social
hall
Borehole
Lay
out
plan
Lay
out
plans
building
and
pit
2006
2004-66
latrines
first
trance
of
units
for
rich
Tiles
and
bricks
Settlement
1997
Total
delivery
time
3
years
up
to
settlement
8
years
12
years
7-8
years
7
years
6
years
total
delivery
time
until
settlement
was
completed
at
the
time
of
the
research.
The
delivery
time
after
land
acquisition
is
influenced
by
incremental
building
and
informal
subdivision
(BHC),
political/environmental
disputes
(KNT),
8
availability
of
support
organisations
and
size
of
initiative
(SBNM),
business
approach
to
collective
settling
(TMSS),
and
changes
in
sense
of
urgency
through
time
and
generation
gap
(OWAB,
SBNM).
8
Housing
finance
trust
Jamii
Bora
arranged
almost
everything
possible
to
prevent
conflicts
over
interests
with
the
local
community
that
could
negatively
influence
land
access
and
delivery
time
(witnessed
Memorandum
of
Understanding
with
the
local
community,
4o
extra
acres
of
land
to
fulfil
administrative
requirements)
(Biamah,
2004).
The
stakeholder
analysis
however
still
turned
out
to
be
too
limited
to
the
local
and
project
level.
Delivery
time
was
heavily
influenced
through
a
major
political
dispute
based
on
environmental
arguments
during
the
obligatory
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
(EIA),
instigated
by
the
threat
to
interests
of
the
Kajiado
area
MP/
Minister
of
Education
in
terms
of
imbalanced
political
representation
through
the
settlement
of
Io,000
slum
dwellers.
After
rejection
of
the
EIA
by
the
National
Environment
Management
Authority
(NEMA,
2005),
and
a
successful
appeal
on
conditions
to
the
National
Environmental
Tribunal
(Republic
of
Kenya,
2005),
eventually
in
2007
the
High
Court
approved
settlement.
44
Bob
Hendriks
„sidOrigir"
NMI
Fr
Figure
5
Idle
land:
(a)
KNT,
(b)
SBNM
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
45
Property
rights
All
initiatives
provided
the
residents
with
the
basic
rights
to
occupy,
use,
enjoy,
restrict
and
inherit
their
land
(see
Table
3).
BHC
is
the
only
initiative
that
chose
incremental
building
and
allows
its
members
the
rights
to
dispose,
buy
and
develop/improve
their
plots.
Most
initiatives
try
to
avoid
the
question
of
disposing
of
land,
but
in
the
future
it
will
almost
inevitably
become
an
issue.
BHC
is
also
the
only
initiative
at
the
moment
allowing
the
right
to
sublet
and
fix
rent.
The
members
of
the
smaller
initiatives
(BHC,
OWAB,
GSS)
have
the
right
to
run
their
businesses
on
their
own
plots.
For
members
of
the
larger
initiatives
(SBNM,
KNT,
TMSS)
this
right
is
mostly
limited
to
specifi-
cally
allocated
plots
and
requires
payment.
SBNM
is
the
only
initiative
where
share
certificates
actually
served
as
collateral
for
access
to
micro-credit,
although
offered
by
SBNM
itself
and
introduced
as
a
way
of
limiting
loan
arrears.
Table
3
Property
rights
(BHC,
KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB)
BHC
OWAB
SBNM
KNT
GSS
TMSS
Occupy/use/enjoy
X X
X X
X
X
Restrict
X X
X X
X
X
Inherit
X X
X X
X
X
Dispose,
buy
X
Develop/improve
X
Cultivate/produce
on
own
plot
X X
X
Cultivate/produce
on
allocated
plot
X X
X
Sublet
X
Sublet
and
fix
rent
X
Access
to
(mortgage)
micro-credit
X
Access
to
(mortgage)
institutional
credit
Social
impacts
Perceived
tenure
security
KNT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB.
All
initiatives
except
BHC
are
still
preparing
to
relocate.
Tenure
security
for
these
initiatives
is
planned
to
be
accomplished
through
the
provision
of
share
certificates.
BHC.
The
members
of
BHC
relocated
in
1997,
but
nobody
has
yet
been
issued
with
an
individual
formal
title
deed.
Share
certificates
have
been
acquired
for
about
29
per
cent
of
the
plots.
9
By
May
2004,
loans
were
cleared
for
half
of
the
remaining
9
A
total
of
40
share
certificates
were
issued
to
19
present
original
owners
present,
five
absent
original
owners,
four
present
second
owners,
five
absent
second
owners,
and
seven
not
stated.
Bellevue
Housing
Cooperative
Legal
block
title
139
members
r,ti
44.
0
9f\
Original
owners
who
stayed
in
Kicheko
until
now
40
members
(3
22;
918)
Original
owners
who
stayed
for
some
time
in
Kicheko
63
members
(3
28;
9
35)
Original
owners
who
never
stayed
in
Kicheko
36
members
(3
14
9
22)
0
5
10
15
20
25
139
plots
DUD
female
DUD
male
Female
•Male
(3
66;
9
73)
Legend:
°OPT
=
original
owner
present
with
tenants
OOP
=
original
owner
present
OOPoT
=
original
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
GOAT
=
original
owner
absent
with
tenants
OOA
=
original
owner
absent
OOART=
original
owner
absent
relative
with
tenants
OOAR
=
original
owner
absent
relative
SOAT
=
second
owner
absent
with
tenants
SOA
=
second
owner
absent
SOPT
=
second
owner
present
with
tenants
SOP
=
second
owner
present
SOPoT
=
second
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
SOPo
=
second
owner
present
on
other
plot
TOPoT
=
third
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
UD
=
undeveloped
ST
=
stayed
for
some
time
in
Kicheko
NS
=
never
stayed
in
Kicheko
14
1
40
plots
(29%)
21
1
53
plots
2
(38%)
3
I
,.
45
plots
(32%)
1
plot
(1%)
7
()OPT
OOP
00PoT
(15
ST/
13
NS)
GOAT
(15
ST/
5
NS)
OOA
(1
ST/
1
NS)
00ART
9
ST/
1
NS)
OOAR
(17
ST/
2
NS)
SOAT
(6
ST/
6
NS)
SOA
(3
ST/
3
NS)
SOPT
(1
NS)
SOP
(2
ST/
3
NS)
SOPoT
(1
ST/
1
NS)
SOPo
(1
ST)
TOPoT
3
2
46
Bob
Hendriks
Figure
6
Security
of
land
access
and
tenure,
BHC
(March
and
November
2006)
plots,
and
remained
pending
for
21
per
cent
of
the
plots,
with
arrears
predominantly
below
and
some
above
Ksh
io,000.
The
owners
who
cleared
their
loans
without
acquiring
a
share
certificate
indicate
that
tenure
security
is
felt
through
the
collective
block
title
deed,
payment
receipts,
records
in
the
cooperative
logbook
and
trust.
Most
of
them
feel
enough
tenure
security
to
avoid
paying
Ksh
moo
for
a
share
certificate.
It
is
remarkable
that
second
owners
are
also
not
demanding
share
certificates
for
security.
Tenure
security
is
however
increased
through
a
formal written
agreement
between
the
original
and
the
second
owner
against
payment
of
Ksh
500,
payment
registration
of
a
Ksh
6500
entry
fee
for
second
owners,
the
informal
practice
of
land
ownership
transfer
in
the
register
witnessed
by
the
cooperative
committee,
and
trust
resulting
from
membership
of
the
social
networks
of
the
original
owners.
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
47
Building
strategies
KAT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB.
Almost
all
initiatives
opt
for
low-cost
building
to
avoid
new
slum
creation,
encourage
uniformity,
and
make
use
of
economies
of
scale.
KNT,
SBNM
and
TMSS
plan
to
increase
affordability
for
the
poor
through
using
low-cost
building
materials
and
methods
in
accordance
with
the
Building
Code
for
Low
Cost
Housing.
The
smaller
GSS
and
OWAB
also
opt
for
this,
but
still
consider
incremental
building
as
an
alternative
option.
The
production
of
low-cost
building
materials
also
serves
as
an
income-generating
activity
for
members.
BHC.
The
case
of
BHC
shows
that
even
with
the
strategy
of
incremental
building,
which
allows
the
poor
to
gradually
build
and
develop
their
units
at
their
own
pace,
it
is
still
hard
for
the
poor
and
very
poorest
to
gain
and
maintain
(sustainable)
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
(see
Fig.
6
and
Figs.
7,
8
and
g).
29
per
cent
of
the
original
owners
still
live
on
their
original
plots.
These
original
owners
accomplished
sustainable
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure.
The
40
plots
are
owned
by
38
families,
with
two
families
each
owning
two
plots
from
the
start
as
husband
and
wife
and
being
present
on
the
other
plot.
Four
extra
plots
are
owned
by
these
original
owners
as
second
owners
present
on
the
other
plot,
including
two
owned
by
the
same
family
that
owned
two
plots
from
the
start.
So,
in
total
44
plots
are
owned
by
people
who
have
remained
up
to
now
in
Kicheko
village.
38
per
cent
of
the
original
owners
are
absent,
that
is
not
living
in
Kicheko
village
but
still
'owning'
the
plot.
These
original
absentee
owners
have
access
to
land,
but
not
to
secure
tenure
in
Kicheko
village,
although
four
achieved
secure
tenure
for
relatives.
3o
plots
are
used
for
renting
rooms
to
tenants,
whereby
14
owners
never
stayed
and
16
stayed
for
some
time.
18
plots
remained
undeveloped,
whereby
14
owners
never
stayed
and
four
stayed
for
some
time.
One
plot
is
developed
but
without
renting
rooms
to
tenants,
and
three
plots
are
in
use
by
a
relative
without
tenants.'
33
per
cent
of
plots
have
changed
hands
from
original
owner
to
second
or
third
owner.
The
original
owners
of
these
plots
do
not
have
access
to
land
or
secure
tenure
in
Kicheko
village.
16
original
owners
of
these
plots
never
stayed
in
Kicheko
village,
whereby
11
plots
remained
undeveloped.
3o
original
owners
of
these
plots
stayed
for
some
time
in
Kicheko
village.
m
BHC
faces
a
dispute
with
its
neighbour
over
encroachment
of
its
boundaries
since
settle-
ment
in
1997,
occupying
half
the
surface
area
of
22
subdivided
plots
of
13
by
14
m,
partly
to
locate
a
water
tank.
Half
of
the
owners
are
absentee
original
owners
renting
out
rooms,
as
plots
are
considered
too
small
for
family
purposes.
Of
the
remaining
plots
only
four
are
used
for
residential
purposes.
48
Bob
Hendriks
_
Figure
7
BHC,
overview
lu
ll
Iraq
t-
Iaillll
Figure
8
BHC:
original
owner
present
(new
iron
sheet,
mud
floor
and
private
stone
pit
latrine)
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
49
r.
Figure
9
BHC:
original
owner
present
with
tenants
(two-storey
stone
house)
Income-generating
strategies
KNT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB.
Three
of
the
initiatives
are
actively
considering
possible
strategies
of
income
generation
and
job
creation
at
the
new
location.
TMSS
intends
to
use
the
strategy
of
renting
and
selling
collective
plots
to
outside
businesses
(a
hotel
for
delegates
attending
conferences
in
Nairobi,
and
a
petrol
station)
and
creating
a
market
area.
Their
strategic
location
next
to
the
main
road
was
deliberately
chosen
and
six
times
more
expensive
than
the
nearby
plot
of
GSS.
The
whole
initiative
is
approached
like
a
collective
business
investment.
OWAB
acquired
land
through
a
donation
and
sees
horticulture
as
the
most
feasible
strategy
for
income
generation,
as
the
red
soil
is
very
fertile
and
there
are
no
other
types
of
business
around.
It
remains
to
be
seen
whether
the
plot
is
big
enough
for
farming
and
for
how
long
the
already
ageing
female
members
of
the
community
are
still
capable
of
farming.
GSS
considers
small-scale
farming
as
a
viable
option,
for
which
the
purchase
of
water
boreholes
and
acquisition
of
an
additional
plot
are
preconditions.
BHC.
A
major
income-generating
strategy
applied
at
BHC
is
renting
rooms
to
tenants.
As
economic
activity
within
the
area
grew
rapidly
and
attracted
many
migrant
workers
by
the
end
of
the
iggos,
this
became
a
popular
strategy
applied
by
40
per
cent
of
the
original
owners
(see
Table
4).
50
Bob
Hendriks
Table
4
Number
of
owners
with
tenants
and
number
of
tenants
per
ownership
type
(BHC)
Type
of
ownership
Tenants
No
tenants
Average
number
of
tenants
per
plot
Above
average
number
of
tenants
Present
original
owner
63%
37%
4.0
tenants
3
x
5;
1
x
6;
1
x
(25
plots)
(15
plots)
7;
1
x
8;
1
x
12
Absentee
original
57%
43%
2.7
tenants
1
x
3;
4
x
4;
1
x
owner
(30
plots)
(23
plots)
6;
1
x
7;
1
x
9
Present
second
owner
75%
25%
2.5
tenants
1
x
3;
1
x
7
(12
plots)
(3
plots)
Absentee
second
61%
39%
6.1
tenants
1
x
7;
3
x
8;
7
x
owner
(19
plots)
(12
plots)
9;
1
x
11
Total
86
plots
53
plots
3.8
tenants
N =
139
Of
the
original
owners
present,
63
per
cent
rent
out
rooms,
with
on
average
four
tenants
per
plot.
Six
of
them
combine
this
strategy
with
businesses
on
their
plots,
often
targeting
the
internal
market
(vegetable
kiosk,
hotel,
milk
shop,
charcoal,
waste
material,
saloon).
Most
others
have
casual
jobs
or
are
self-employed
(for
example
catering
to
employees
of
surrounding
factories).
A
few
owners
keep
some
goats,
chicken,
sheep
and
a
cow.
Of
the
original
absentee
owners,
57
per
cent
rent
out
rooms
to
tenants,
with
on
average
2.7
tenants
per
plot.
16
owners
stayed
for
some
time
on
their
plots
with
or
without
tenants
and
afterwards
moved
and
started
renting
out
rooms.
14
owners
never
stayed
on
their
plots
and
applied
the
strategy
of
renting
out
rooms
from
the
beginning.
Absentee
second
owners
also
rent
out
rooms
intensively:
14
per
cent,
with
an
average
of
six
tenants
per
plot.
Of
the
37
per
cent
of
original
owners
present
without
tenants,
13
were
able
to
accomplish
sustainable
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
through
running
a
business,
hawking,
casual
jobs
and
formal
jobs.
Some
keep
a
few
goats,
chicken,
ducks
and
sheep.
The
two
remaining
plots
are
used
by
original
owners
present
on
another
plot,
renting
rooms
to
tenants
elsewhere
in
Kicheko.
Access
to
basic
services
KAT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS.
OWAB
and
BHC.
All
initiatives
provide
major
improvements
in
access
to
basic
services
for
the
poor
at
the
sites
in
comparison to
the
situation
in
the
informal
settlements
(see
Table
5
and
Figs.
1o,
II
and
12).
This
applies
not
only
to
technical
quality,
but
also
to
the
degree
of
formality
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
51
Table
5
Access
to
basic
services
at
former
informal
settlement
and
new
location
(BHC,
KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB)
Service
Informal
settlements
Land-buying
cooperatives
and
trusts
Toilets
'Flying
toilet'
and
open
field
Overflowing
sewers
Improvised
latrines
Overcrowded
concrete
toilet
blocks
requiring
payment
Water
Contaminated
water
sources
Water
taps
requiring
payment
'Illegal'
water
tapping
from
City
Council
Lighting
Candles
Tin
kerosene
lamps
'Illegal'
electricity
tapping
Waste
Community
clean-ups
Littering
Education
Informal
nursery
schools
within
Informal
primary
schools
within
Formal
primary
schools
on
the
borders
Health
Many
nearby
clinics
Short
distance
to
hospital
Community
pit
latrines
(BHC,
OWAB)
Private
stone
pit
latrines
(BHC)
Self-contained
flush
toilets
and
bathrooms
in
each
housing
unit
(KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS)
Sanitary
waste
manager
(KNT)
Water
vendor
and
not
water
line
(BHC)
Tap
water
through
boreholes
(KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB)
Kerosene
and
candles
(BHC,
OWAB,
GSS)
Electricity
(KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS)
Fortnightly
clean-up
and
burning
(BHC)
Collection
services
(KNT,
SBNM,
TMSS)
Nursery
and
primary
schools
on
territory
(KNT,
TMSS)
Fewer
nearby
clinics
(KNT,
TMSS,
GSS)
Longer
distance
to
hospital
Gender
equity
KAT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS.
OWAB.
All
initiatives
intend
to
treat
their
members
equally
and
strive
for
equal
access
for
women
and
men.
In
OWAB
almost
all
members
are
women
above
fifty,
except
for
two
men
and
five
younger
women
who
replaced
members
who
died
from
AIDS.
BHC.
The
overall
figures
on
land
access
at
BHC
suggest
that
women
and
men
have
almost
equal
access
to
land
and
that
registered
male
and
female
plot
ownership
have
remained
almost
equal
over
the
years:
54
per
cent
female
ownership
in
1997
and
53
per
cent
in
2006
(see
Fig.
6).
Looking
in
more
detail
at
the
real
underlying
dynamics,
some
significant
gender
differences
in
access
and
strategies
of
access
to
land
and
tenure
security
can
however
be
observed.
Although
formally
men
and
women
were
equally
able
to
acquire
individual
access
to
plots
registered
in
their
own
name,
in
practice
women's
access
to
land
is
still
very
much
related
to
marital
status.
The
majority
of
the
female
original
owners
present
acquired
access
to
land
at
the
time
of
plot
acquisition
through
marriage
(see
Table
6).
The
plot
registered
in
the
wife's
name
is
often
used
for
renting,
while
the
couple
live
together
on
the
husband's
plot
or
while
the
wife
lives
in
the
rural
area.
Of
the
original
owners
present
there
are
only
two
married
couples
with
husband
and
wife
living
on
their
own
separate
plots.
52
Bob
Hendriks
T.
w
.
•••
=-7
1t
4
mg.
Figure
10
Mitumba:
private
old
iron
sheet,
wood,
polythene
latrines,
right
next
to
Wilson
Airport
I
o4.
Figure
11
Mitumba:
private
old
iron
sheet,
wood,
polythene
latrines,
right
next
to
Wilson
Airport
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
53
Figure
12
BHC:
private
stone/
new
iron
sheet
pit
latrine
4.
0
°lilt'
4,
Women
tend
to
prefer
the
livelihood
strategies
of
absentee
original
owner
renting
rooms
to
tenants
more
than
men,
while
men
prefer
the
strategy
of
original
owner
present
with
tenants
more
than
women
(see
Table
7).
54
per
cent
more
women
than
men
chose
the
strategy
of
absentee
original
owner
renting
rooms
to
tenants,
with
on
average
2.5
tenants
for
both
men
and
women.
A
clear
explanation
for
this
difference
in
strategy
is
hard
to
provide
on
the
basis
of
the
limited
number
of
absentee
original
owners
traced.
About
half
of
the
women
and
men
involved
chose
the
strategy
from
the
beginning
and
never
stayed
in
Kicheko.
Factors
influencing
the
choice
of
strategy
are
the
small
size
of
the
encroached
plots
for
family
life
and
the
bad
local
economic
and
living
circumstances
in
Kicheko
at
the
start.
About
half
of
the
absentee
original
owners
involved,
both
male
and
female,
moved
to
a
better
destination.
20
per
cent
more
men
than
women
chose
the
strategy
of
original
owner
present
renting
rooms,
with
on
average
3.5
tenants
for
men
and
5
tenants
for
women,
partly
explained
by
the
tendency
of
couples
to
live
on
the
husband's
plot.
54
Bob
Hendriks
Table
6
Marital
status
of
female
original
owners
present
at
the
time
of
plot
acquisition
(BHC)
Marital
status
Frequency
Percentage
Married
8
44.4
Widowed
5
27.7
Cohabiting
1
5.6
Separated
1
5.6
Never
married
1
5.6
Not
stated
2
11.1
Total
18
100
Men
tend
to
be
relatively
more
involved
in
plot
transactions,
while
relatively
more
women
are
absentee
original
owners
with
undeveloped
plots.
In
regard
to
transactions
of
plots,
12
per
cent
more
male
than
female
original
owners
chose
the
strategy
of
selling
their
plots.
The
reasons
did
not
vary
between
men
and
women
(see
'Property
values
and
reasons
for
selling',
below).
22
per
cent
more
male
than
female
second
owners
bought
plots.
This
seems
to
confirm
the
idea
that
access
to
land
in
the
Kenyan
land
market
is
harder
for
women.
Finally,
22
per
cent
more
female
than
male
absentee
original
owners
remained
with
undeveloped
plots,
the
majority
from
the
beginning
and
two
staying
for
some
time
and
then
relocating
to
better
destinations.
Table
7
Gender
differences
in
strategies
of
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
(BHC)
Gender
Renting
rooms
to
tenants
Transaction
of
plots
Development
OOPT
GOAT
Never
Stayed
Selling
Buying
UD
stayed
Female
40%
77%
71%
81%
56%
39%
61%
10
plots)
(23
plots)
(1
0
plots)
(13
plots)
(20
plots)
(18
plots)
(11
plots)
Male
60%
23%
29%
19%
44%
61%
39%
(15
plots)
(7
plots)
(4
plots)
(3
plots)
(26
plots)
(28
plots)
(7
plots)
Total
100%
100%
100% 100%
100%
100%
100%
(25
plots)
(30
plots)
(14
plots)
(16
plots)
(46
plots)
(46
plots)
(18
plots)
Difference
-/-
20%
+/+
54%
+/+
42%
+/+
62%
+/+
12%
-/-
22%
+/+
22%
(5
plots)
(16
plots)
(6
plots)
(10
plots)
(6
plots)
(10
plots)
(4
plots)
OOPT
=
original
owner
present
with
tenants
GOAT
=
original
owner
absent
with
tenants
UD
=
undeveloped
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
55
Residential
mobility
BHC.
At
BHC
residential
mobility
was
analysed
through
the
moves
of
absentee
owners.
62
per
cent
of
absentee
original
owners
were
successful
in
moving
to
better
destinations
in
Nairobi,
other
Kenyan
towns
and
especially
upcountry
in
their
rural
homes
(40
per
cent)
with
tenure
security,
after
staying
for
some
time
or
never
staying
in
Kicheko.
The
remaining
38
per
cent
of
plot
owners
went
back
to
Mitumba
and
to
less
desirable
destinations
in
other
informal
settlements.
This
was
partly
due
to
the
bad
economic
situation
and
living
conditions
in
the
settlement
area
just
after
reloca-
tion
and
partly
confirms
the
notion
that
the
poor
often
return
to
locations
near
the
city
centre.
Economic
impacts
Poverty
reduction
KAT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB.
All
five
initiatives
are
expected
to
reach
the
poor
and
three
are
expected
to
reach
the
very
poorest.
OWAB
reaches
48
very
poorest
and
two
non-poor
households
according
to
the
criteria
of
wealth
ranking,
absolute
poverty
line
and
absence
of
basic
needs."
KNT
mainly
reaches
poor
and
non-poor
house-
holds,
as
the
expected
monthly
rent
of
Ksh
250o
for
housing
units
and
additional
transport
costs
to
Nairobi
are
unaffordable
for
the
very
poorest.
SBNM
reaches
both
very
poorest
and
poor
households
by
differentiating
housing
units
in
different
poverty
categories.
TMSS
caters
for
the
poor
as
the
traders
are
relatively
better
off.
GSS
caters
for
the
very
poorest:
2
BHC.
In
BHC,
at
the
time
of
plot
acquisition,
almost
all
139
original
owners
moving
from
Mitumba
could
be
categorised
as
very
poorest,
due
to
the
absence
of
basic
needs
of
shelter,
food
and
clothes
and
not
owning
two
or
more
wealth
ranking
assets.
A
few
non-poor
households
entered
as
the
plots
needed
to
be
divided,
while
15
original
owners
never
stayed
and
immediately
went
to
more
affluent
destinations.
From
1997
to
2006
to
present
original
owners
changed
status
from
very
poorest
to
poor
based
on
the
criteria
of
the
food
poverty
line
and
absolute
poverty
line,
due
to
a
monthly
income
of
at
least
Ksh
250o
gained
by
renting
out
five
or
more
rooms
at
Ksh
Soo
per
month
(see
Table
4).
Of
these
to
original
owners,
five
households
can
Only
one
household
has
access
to
multiple
urban
plots.
The
most
valuable
possessions
of
OWAB
members
are:
(1)
television
(io
per
cent),
radio
(90
per
cent),
mobile
phone
(46
per
cent);
knitting
machine
(i8
per
cent);
(2)
kitchenware;
(3)
sofa
set
and
chairs.
12
69
per
cent
(63
per
cent
male,
73
per
cent
female)
of
Huruma
residents
earn
Ksh
moo
or
less
per
month,
i8
per
cent
(27
per
cent
male,
19
per
cent
female)
between
Ksh
mo!
and
4000,
5
per
cent
(7
per
cent
male,
3
per
cent
female)
between
Ksh
400!
and
6000
and
2
per
cent
(2
per
cent
male,
i
per
cent
female)
above
Ksh
6000
with
an
average
of
3.!
persons
per
household
(Pamoja
Trust,
zoo!).
56
Bob
Hendriks
ti
Figure
13
BHC:
original
owner
present
with
tenants
(March
2006)
la-
Figure
14
BHC:
new
iron
sheet,
concrete
floor,
same
owner
present
with
extra
tenants
(November
2006)
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
57
be
considered
non-poor
on
the
basis
of
wealth
ranking:
3
Furthermore,
24
absentee
original
owners
with
on
average
2.7
tenants
are
crossing
the
food
poverty
line
by
renting
out
rooms
at
Ksh
500
per
month:
4
Investments
in
housing
improvements
BHC.
53
per
cent
of
the
initial
original
owners
at
BHC
perceived
the
block
title
deed,
payment
receipts
and
record
keeping
in
the
cooperative's
logbook
as
enough
tenure
security
to
invest
incrementally
in
developing
their
plots.
They
invested
in
the
quality
of
their
own
structures,
rental
structures
and
private
pit
latrines
(see
Table
8
and
Figs.
13
and
14).
42
per
cent
of
the
current
original
owners
invested
in
improvements
to
stone
houses
and
new
iron
sheet
structures,
with
almost
two
thirds
renting
out
rooms
to
tenants.
The
remaining
58
per
cent
original
owners
accomplished
a
general
improve-
ment
from
old
iron
sheets,
wooden,
cardboard
and
polythene
structures
in
Mitumba
to
combined
new
and
old
iron
sheet
and
wooden
structures,
old
iron
sheet
structures
and
old
iron
sheet
and
wood
structures.
Almost
one
third
of
the
original
owners
invested
considerably
in
construction
of
a
private
stone
pit
latrine
(Ksh
30-40,000,
as
costs
to
dig
the
rocky
soil
are
high),
the
majority
of
them
renting
out
rooms
to
tenants.
Furthermore,
the
change
of
living
environment
and
the
lower
congestion
are
improvements
for
all
original
owners
present.
On
the
other
hand,
22
per
cent
of
the
plots
remained
undeveloped,
14
per
cent
with
absentee
original
owners
and
eight
per
cent
with
absentee
second
owners.
Property
values
and
reasons
for
selling
BHC.
For
quite
a
number
of
original
owners
at
BHC
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
was
still
too
expensive.
Major
reasons
mentioned
for
selling
their
plots
by
i i
former
original
owners,
with
only
one
of
them
renting
out
rooms
to
tenants,
involved
a
combination
of
factors:
school
fees;
lack
of
work
or
no
casual
job
nearby;
hospital
expenses;
encroached
land;
security
risk
(theft,
violence,
rape);
bad
omen
of
son
falling
into
flooded
pit
latrine.
The
repeated
pressure
of
loan
repayment
notices
by
housing
cooperative
union
NACHU,
after
completion
of
the
loan
period
in
2002,
2003
and
2004,
often
settled
the
matter.
Land
values
for
the
sold
plots
ranged
from
between
Ksh
15,00o
and
60,00o
in
iggg
up
to
between
Ksh
115,00o
and
150,00o
in
2005.
13
These
are
the
multiple
plot
owners:
one
couple
owning
three
plots,
of
which
one
has
a
stone
house
(built
through
support
from
a
relative
abroad), one
couple
owning
five
plots,
two
couples
owning
two
plots
and
one
couple
owning
two
plots
and
cohabiting
on
another
plot.
Plot
acquisition
was
either
through
buying
plots
or
multiple
ownership
from
the
start.
14
The
most
valuable
possessions
of
the
interviewed
BHC
households
are:
plot
in
Kicheko
village
(24
per
cent),
charcoal
brazier
(20
per
cent),
radio
(i8
per
cent),
television
(13
per
cent),
rural
land
(9
per
cent),
bicycle
per
cent),
livestock
(2
per
cent).
58
Bob
Hendriks
Table
8
Investments
in
housing
improvements
(BHC)
Ownership
Developed
Walls
Roof
Floor
Toilet
Undeve-
loped
Stone
New New
Old Old
New
New
Old
Cement
Private
iron
&
old
iron
iron
iron
&
old
iron
stone
sheets
iron
sheets sheets
sheets
iron
sheets
pit
sheets
sheets
latrine
OOP
15
1
5
1
7
1
1
3
11
6
4
°OPT
25
1
7
9
7
1
3
1
21
8
OSOPoT
4
1
1
1 1
2
OSOPo
OOA
2
1
1
1
1
3
18
OOAR
3
3
1
2
1
OOART
2
2
2
GOAT
28
1
10
2
12
3
2 2
24
6
Subtotal
79
4
29
12
28
6
9
6
63
6
24
18
SOP
1
1
1
1
SOPT
6
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
1
SOPo
2
SOPoT
1
1
SOA
3
1 1 1
1
2
1
9
SOAT
19
12
2
3
2
3
1
13
5
TOPoT
1
1
1
Subtotal
31
16
5
7
2
7
11
Total
110
4
45
17
35
8
31
29
N
=
139
OOP
=
original
owner
present
OOPT
=
original
owner
present
with
tenants
OSOPoT
=
original
second
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
OSOP
=
original
second
owner
present
OOA
=
original
owner
absent
OOAR
=
original
owner
absent
relative
OOART
=
original
owner
absent
relative
with
tenants
GOAT
=
original
owner
absent
with
tenants
SOP
=
second
owner
present
SOPT
=
second
owner
present
with
tenants
SOPo
=
second
owner
present
on
other
plot
SOPoT
=
second
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
SOA
=
second
owner
absent
SOAT
=
second
owner
absent
with
tenants
TOPoT
=
third
owner
present
on
other
plot
with
tenants
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
59
Access
to
mortgage,
formal
institutional
credit
and
micro-credit
KAT
SBNM,
TMSS,
GSS,
OWAB.
In
the
case
of
SBNM
individual
micro-credit
loans
with
share
certificates
as
collateral
were
introduced,
mainly
in
order
to
reduce
the
repeated
default
in
repayment
of
small
business
micro-credit
loans
that
were
issued
earlier
in
order
to
further
enable
repayment
of
the
housing
loans.
BHC.
Most
of
the
original
BHC
members
were
not
interested
in
formalisation
through
share
certificates
and
individual
land
titles
that
could
offer
access
to
collat-
eralised
lending.
Formal
interest
rates
for
credit
were
considered
too
high.
Micro-
credit
housing
loans
with
favourable
conditions,
in
which
the
members
expressed
their
interest,
were
only
to
become
available
upon
full
completion
of
the
collective
land
purchase
loan.
The
involved
costs
for
the
documents
were
consequently
not
considered
worthwhile
and
only
40
share
certificates
were
issued.
It
is
also
remarkable
that
second
owners
are
not
interested
in
formal
documents.
The
preferred
strategy
is
renting
out
rooms
to
tenants
and
investing
the
collected
rent
in
structures
and
additional
plots.
Enabling
structures
and
contexts
The
social
and
economic
impacts
of
hybrid
land
delivery
systems
can
be
increased
through
strengthening
the
enabling
structures
and
contexts.
To
incorporate
all
possible
beneficial
strategies,
it
is
important
to
apply
from
the
start
an
integrated
livelihoods
approach
to
land
access,
housing
and
income-generation
and
to
take
into
consider-
ation
more
selection
criteria
for
land
than
price
alone,
such
as
location,
medium-
and
long-term
socio-economic
growth
and
migration
prospects.
Given
the
long
delivery
time
involved,
delivery
time
should
also
be
included
as
a
criterion.
By
carrying
out
a
quick
scan
of
strategic
stakeholders'
interests
at
various
levels
and
of
market
opportu-
nities,
delivery
time
can
be
better
estimated
and
interventions
planned.
Exploitation
of
delivery
time
through
efficient
and
profitable
utilisation
of
the
idle
land,
either
collectively
or
individually,
can
contribute
to
the
sustainability
of
land
access
for
the
poor
and
poverty
reduction.
The
case
studies
indicate
a
period
of
idle
land
after
access
of
between
two
and
ten
years.
The
case
of
BHC
indicates
the
possibility
of
deliberately
utilising
the
time
gap
between
the
moment
of
land
purchase
at
affordable
prices
for
the
poor
and
the
moment
of
favourable
local
socio-economic
developments
in
the
area.
Incorporation
of
a
collective
business
approach
to
the
initiative
as
a
whole
(TMSS),
the
property
right
to
rent
out
rooms
as
a
planned
strategy
(BHC)
also
in
the
case
of
low-cost
building
initiatives
through
integration
in
the
housing
design,
as
the
higher
building
and
housing
costs
can
be
covered
by
higher
rents
to
tenants
financing
housing
units,
infrastructure
and/or
basic
services
through
a
market-oriented
approach
of
partly
selling
or
renting
housing
units
to
middle-income
households
for
higher
prices
(SBNM),
and
realistic
membership
regulations
on
poverty
levels
and
gender
in
case
of
60
Bob
Hendriks
land
sale
to
new
owners,
taking
into
account
the
reality
of
rapid
increases
in
property
values,
could
contribute
to
the
sustainable
access
of
the
poor
and
very
poorest.
Positive
impacts
could
also
be
increased
through
an
extension
of
roles
and
capabilities
of
local
initiatives,
government
and
mediating
support
organisations
in
accommodating
inclusive
peri-urban
land
governance.
Local
initiatives
and
support
organisations
need
to
jointly
claim
stakeholder
participation
to
enforce
rules
and
mechanisms
of
social
land
management,
instead
of
waiting
for
invitations
from
insti-
tutions
and
limited
participation
in
projects.
Local
initiatives
need
to
increase
their
level
of
strategic
action
in
private
land
markets
and
profitable
and
efficient
land
utili-
sation
during
delivery
time.
Government,
national
and
local,
should
start
to
facilitate
as
well
as
control
the
reduction
of
delivery
time
(reduction
of
dispute
time,
speeding
up
of
application
procedures,
remedying
the
lack
of
support
organisations)
in
line
with
the
intentions
towards
squatters
in
the
draft
National
Land
Policy
(Republic
of
Kenya
and
Kenya
Land
Alliance,
2006).
Mediating
support
organisations
need
to
provide
support
for
strategic
land-buying
processes
(rapid
surveys
of
economic
opportunities,
adequate
stakeholder
analysis);
enable
profitable
and
efficient
utilisa-
tion
of
idle
land
during
delivery
time;
conclude
partnership
contracts
between
the
initiatives
and
private
sector
businesses;
provide
infrastructure
grants;
and
facilitate
knowledge
exchange
and
learning
between
local
hybrid/informal
initiatives,
local
and
international
support
organisations.
They
probably
also
need
to
(re)address
the
moral
question
of
whether
they
want
to
'play
the
game'
of
private
land
markets
and
consider
who
carries
the
long-term
responsibility
for
risks
and
benefits
of
strategic
land
invest-
ments.
Finally,
in
relation
to
the
specific
case
study
communities,
faster
ways
forward
are
needed
for
the
currently
struggling
initiatives
of
KNT
(delay
in
court),
BHC
(partner-
ship
on
solid
waste
collection
and
connection
to
electricity),
SBNM
(non-transpar-
ency;
micro-finance
support
for
low-cost
building;
utilisation
of
idle
land),
OWAB
(efficient
and
profitable
land
utilisation),
possibly
through
community—private
sector
or
community—public
sector
partnerships.
Conclusions
This
study
indicates
the
viability
of
a
possible
'third
way'
of
hybrid
land
access
and
secure
tenure,
distinct
from
those
thought
to
be
purely
traditional
or
contemporary,
through
formal
collective
land
purchase
and
informal
land
subdivision
by
the
poor
and
very
poorest
in
peri-urban
areas
of
Nairobi
and
other
sub-Saharan
African
metro-
politan
cities
characterised
by
a
context
of
high
commodification,
rapidly
rising
land
values
and
high
market
pressures.
A
precondition
for
applicability
in
other
contexts
is
at
least
some
accommodation
and
tolerance
regarding
non-compliance
with
formal
standards
by
the
authorities
and
the
legal
rights,
ease
and
relatively
low
costs
of
regis-
Peri-urban
access
to
land
and
secure
tenure
for
the
poor
in
Nairobi,
Kenya
61
tration
which
are
culturally
and
historically
embedded
in
the
Kenyan
context.
The
findings
of
this
study
indicate
that,
however
difficult
it
might
be,
it
is
possible
for
the
poor
and
very
poorest
households
from
informal
settlements
mostly
in
partnership
with
finance
institutions
for
low-income
housing
to
both
continue
to
pay
their
rent
(or
in
some
cases
not
pay
rent)
and
save
or
repay
a
loan
to
purchase
land
in
peri-urban
areas.
This
is
especially
true
in
cases
where
there
is
a
clear
and
unambiguous
vision
of
the
purpose
of
saving.
The
costs
of
building
in
advance
of
relocation,
which
mostly
include
provision
of
infrastructure
and
basic
services
and
the
advantages
of
economies
of
scale,
volume
and
uniformity,
are
often
too
high
a
burden
and
not
affordable
for
the
very
poorest.
The
benefits
from
the
acquired
land
are
mostly
delayed,
micro-credit
for
housing
loans
is
mainly
available
after
collective
repayment
of
land
purchase
loans,
and
the
(future)
property
rights
and
housing
design
for
habitat
as
asset
are
often
limited.
Contemporary
approaches
of
infrastructure
grants
and
integration
of
middle-income
households
to
finance
infrastructure
and
basic
services
try
to
overcome
some
of
these
limitations.
The
research
shows
that
with
sufficient
perceived
tenure
security
and
expected
return
on
investment
the
poor
and
very
poorest
are
able
to
invest
in
housing
improve-
ments,
even
without
formal
land
title
or
share
certificates.
This
also
goes
for
new
second
owners.
Access
to
land
and
tenure
not
only
aims
at
secure
shelter
and
housing
at
the
location,
but
is
part
of
the
wider
livelihood
strategies
of
the
poor.
The
contri-
bution
of
access
is
not
only
in
relation
to
the
use
value,
but
also
to
the
exchange
value.
Alternatives
to
collateralised
lending
and
micro-finance
are
found
in
renting
out
rooms
to
tenants,
either
as
a
present
original
owner
or
as
an
absentee
original
owner,
and
dealing
with
the
collective
plot as
a
business.
Process
optimisations
could
protect
poor
and
very
poorest
households
involved
in
future
initiatives
from
the
hardships,
distress
sales
and
relatively
high
number
of
undeveloped
plots
and
plot
transactions
resulting
from
loan
repayment
defaults
that
occurred
at
BHC,
keep
the
number
of
original
poor
owners
involved
at
a
higher
level
and
increase
the
positive
social
and
economic
impacts.
Although
residential
mobility
seems
an
inherent
part
of
life
in
metropolitan
cities,
the
findings
indicate
that
selection
of
a
location
that
at
least
guarantees
income-generating
possibilities
in
the
longer
term
could
contribute
to
increased
sustainability.
This
can
be
through
strategically
anticipating
longer-term
economic
development
prospects
for
the
area,
for
example
by
foreseeing
the
possibility
of
using
the
home
as
an
asset
by
renting
out
rooms
individually
or
collectively,
and
through
adopting
a
collective
business
approach
to
the
initiative
as
a
whole.
During
delivery
time
up
to
the
time
of
settle-
ment
assuming
a
situation
without
evictions
or
demolition
the
bare
land
could
be
strategically
allocated
for
income-generating
purposes
by
the
initiative
instead
of
lying
idle,
as
is
often
currently
the
case.
The
findings
also
indicate
that
even
with
property
sales
and
the
rapid
rise
of
property
values
in
metropolitan
peri-urban
land
markets,
62
Bob
Hendriks
the
poor
are
not
fully
excluded,
as
new
owners
are
often
not
complete
outsiders
but
members
of
joint
social
networks.
In
order
to
further
increase
the
positive
social
and
economic
impacts
of
this
hybrid
land
delivery
channel,
this
paper
has
suggested
strategies
to
strengthen
the
enabling
contexts.
The
challenge
is
to
move
beyond
the
current
individual
experiences
and
relative
naivety
and
create
space
and
influence
for
the
poor
in
strategic
land
gover-
nance
processes,
outside
as
well
as
inside
the
boundaries
of
the
metropolitan
city.
With
the
emergence
of
hybrid
and
other
initiatives
the
issues
of
volume,
uniformity
and
avoidance
of
new
slum
creation
can
no
longer
serve
as
a
sufficient
argument
for
exclusion
of
the
poor,
but
become
issues
to
be
addressed
and
discussed
in
accommo-
dating
inclusive
pro-poor
peri-urban
land
governance.
This
requires
the
extension
of
the
roles
and
capabilities
of
local
initiatives,
government
organisations
and
mediating
support
organisations.
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Acknowledgements
I
would
like
to
acknowledge
the
support
of
Professor
Isa
Baud
in
this
research;
WOTRO/
Netherlands
Research
Council
for
financial
support
of
the
research;
and
the
anonymous
reviewers
for
their
detailed
and
constructive
comments
on
the
paper,
with
of
course
the
usual
disclaimers
being
applied.
Thanks
are
also
due
to
the
local
research
assistants
Erastus
Karogo,
Seline
Odhiambo
and
the
late
George
Onyi
and
to
Patterson
Kuria
Gathuru
for
our
longstanding
friendship.
Finally,
special
thanks
go
to
the
residents
of
the
case
study
communi-
ties
for
sharing
their
experiences
so
openly,
and
to
the
local
support
organisations.